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INTRODUCTION
Auditing is not romantic. The joke has it that an extroverted
auditor is the one who looks at his client’s shoes when he talks to
1
him, rather than at his own shoes. This gray figure, however, plays a
key economic role. For markets to allocate capital efficiently,
investors need to make informed decisions when they buy shares in
public corporations. As those who review and certify the financial
information that companies disclose, auditors are, in the words of the
United States Supreme Court, “public watchdogs” who must have
2
“complete fidelity to the public trust.”
1

LOREN FOX, ENRON: THE RISE AND FALL 181 (2003).
United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 818 (1984) (holding that
the Internal Revenue Service could compel an accountant serving as an independent
auditor to disclose work papers it used in the course of verifying the corporation’s
2
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Somewhat surprisingly, these public watchdogs are hired by the
very corporations that they audit. The Supreme Court has cautioned
that this does not mean that the auditor “works for” the corporate
client. Instead, “by certifying to the public reports that collectively
depict a corporation’s financial status, the independent auditor
assumes a public responsibility transcending any employment
3
relationship with the client.” This is a tall order. In this Article, I will
argue that it is too tall.
In 1934, Justice Harlan Stone famously remarked that
when the history of the financial era which has just drawn to a
close comes to be written, most of its mistakes and its major faults
will be ascribed to the failure to observe the fiduciary principle,
the precept as old as holy writ, that “a man cannot serve two
4
masters.”

Even though other eras of financial scandals have now come and
gone, auditors are still asked to do that, to treat the public as master,
though engaged and paid by another master—the audited
corporation. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was Congress’ response
to the Enron collapse and other spectacular accounting failures. It
stiffened penalties for faulty financial disclosure and improved the
supervision of auditors. It left, however, the two-master problem
unresolved.
This Article will argue that current securities law sets up the
wrong relationships among the auditor, the auditor’s client (the
audited corporation), and the public, thereby creating a regulatory
structure fundamentally at odds with its regulatory purpose. The
structure creates incentives for the auditor to serve the client, while
the law’s purpose calls for the auditor to serve the public. Therefore,
the law should be reformed so that auditors recognize proper
incentives and serve only one master, a master whose own interests
are aligned with those of the investing public.
Briefly, securities disclosure auditing works as follows: a
corporation’s management generates financial data and prepares the
financial statements organizing and analyzing the data. Outside
auditors engaged by the corporation spot-test the underlying data
statement of its contingent tax liabilities and observing that “to insulate from
disclosure a certified public accountant’s interpretations of the client’s financial
statements would be to ignore the significance of the accountant’s role as a
disinterested analyst charged with public obligations”).
3
Id.
4
Harlan F. Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1934),
quoted in Joel Seligman, No One Can Serve Two Masters: Corporate and Securities Law After
Enron, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 449 (2002).
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and evaluate whether the financial statements follow accepted
5
accounting principles. If the auditors are satisfied, they issue an
attestation that states: “In our opinion, the financial statements . . .
present fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of ABC
Company as of [date] in conformity with generally accepted
6
accounting principles.”
Making such an attestation is an elaborate job involving
substantial professional judgment. The underlying economic activity
of X Corporation is almost surely complex, generating complicated
financial data to be reviewed. And, the standards used in the review,
the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”), are
themselves complex. No regulatory scheme could possibly govern
the entire job. Not only can there never be a policeman at each
auditor’s elbow, but even if there were, the auditing standards
themselves could not anticipate every situation in which the public
interest in good auditing might be threatened. Regulation that
would depend on supervision and the threat of punishment simply
could not ensure that the thousands of judgment calls involved in an
audit would be made with the public’s interest in mind. This is
especially true if, in addition to the public’s interest, the auditor must
also consider the interests of the audited corporation. Therefore, the
law must give auditors their own incentive to do what is in the
public’s interest. Even though auditors are subject to regulatory
supervision, they are still engaged and paid by a principal. This
means that regulators should be certain that this principal has an
incentive to want the auditor to do the sort of job that serves the
public’s interest in transparency.
Part I discusses how securities disclosure auditors came to serve
two masters. Auditing generally involves two distinct roles, which
securities law mistakenly has combined into one. Since the Middle
Ages, auditors have served as detectives for owners of enterprises,
scrutinizing books kept by managers and reporting back to the
owners what they discovered. Owners want these reports to be
candid so they can monitor their agents. More recently, auditors
began to play another role, that of certifying information that the
client discloses to a third party. In “certification auditing,” the client
is interested in the auditor’s approval of the information, not an
exacting assessment of its quality. The Securities Acts of 1933 and
5

Joshua Ronen, Post-Enron Reform: Financial Statement Insurance, and GAAP Revisited, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 39, 55 (2002).
6
Erick D. Prohs, Periodic Financial Reporting—A Relic of the Past?, 27 J. CORP. L.
481, 493 n.108 (2002).
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1934 joined these two very different roles. The auditor is supposed to
play the first role, that of scrutinizing the corporation’s financial
statements in order to give a candid assessment of quality (the
auditor as “public watchdog”). The auditor’s actual fee-paying client,
however, is the audited corporation who hires the auditor to play the
second role, that of certifying information. This gives the auditor
essentially two clients—the public and the corporation—each with
different interests.
Part II addresses developments in recent decades that increased
the tension in serving these two masters. Consolidation in the
accounting profession and growth of non-audit consulting services
increased pressures on individual auditors to defer to their clients’
views, while the complexity and flexibility of the GAAP standards
supplied the means to do this; auditors may give considerable
deference to their clients’ analyses and yet still certify that the
statements comply with GAAP. These forces helped produce Enron
7
and other recent scandals. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
improved the auditors’ situation somewhat, particularly by protecting
their independence from their audit clients while simultaneously
giving the clients more incentives to treat their auditors as detectives.
Good reform, however, should go further. Part III looks at
auditing regulation from a broader perspective. It is part of a more
general scheme of regulation via information disclosure, and there
are clear empirical characteristics that distinguish healthy disclosure
schemes from those that die on the vine. I assess specific proposals
for auditing reform in light of these needs and explain why the best is
Financial Statement Insurance (“FSI”). It meets the criteria for a
healthy disclosure scheme, and it returns clarity to the auditor’s role.
In an FSI regime, auditors will have one role: they will be detectives,
working for a client whose financial fortunes depend on their good
detective work.

7

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, 28 & 29 U.S.C.).
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HOW AUDITORS CAME TO WEAR TWO HATS:
A BRIEF JOURNEY THROUGH TIME

A. Traditional Auditing
1.

The Auditor as Detective

Modern American auditing traces its roots to medieval England.
Lords would appoint bailiffs to manage their lands, crops, and cattle.
They would then appoint auditors to keep tabs on the bailiffs. These
auditors served as detectives. They reviewed the bailiffs’ written
accounts and other records and examined their managerial
8
decisions. Auditing was not just available to aristocrats. In an early
version of mandatory information disclosure, anyone whose property
was being held by another person could demand an accounting, and
auditors would be appointed by a court to test the validity of the
accounting. After 1285, court-appointed auditors could even send a
9
person to prison if the accounting showed that money was missing.
Continuing in this vein, nineteenth-century British pioneers of
modern auditing advertised their services as a way to ferret out fraud.
In the 1840s, William Deloitte, founder of the firm known today as
Deloitte & Touche, famously exposed fraudulent practices in the
operations of the Great Northern Railway and Great Eastern
10
Steamship Company.
As recently as the early twentieth century, this original role of
the audit held sway in the United States. Because businesses tended
to be small and closely held, owners would hire auditors mainly to
compare cash holdings with the records to see if the treasurer or
11
cashier was honest. Indeed, this remains a core auditing function.
The standard task of what is now called internal auditing is to inform
owners of the activities of their agents and employees. In the words
of a basic accounting textbook: “Whatever the organization, all audits
have a similar purpose, namely to provide some independent
assurance that those entrusted with resources are made accountable
12
to those who have provided the resources.”
8

S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 275–97 (2d ed.
1981).
9
See Statute of Westminster II, 1285, 13 Edw. 1, c. 11.
10
Jonathan Weil, Behind Wave of Corporate Fraud: A Change in How Auditors Work,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 25, 2004, at A1, A14 [hereinafter Weil, Behind Wave of Corporate
Fraud].
11
WALTER A. STAUB, AUDITING DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE PRESENT CENTURY 9–10
(1942).
12
JOHN ARNOLD ET AL., FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 19 (2d ed. 1994).
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The Accounting Standard Set by the Auditor’s Client

The nature of the standard the auditor uses to assess the quality
of the audited financial information constitutes another variable
influencing the success or failure of auditing. The standard itself can
introduce distortions, as will be discussed later. Logically, the
standard should be suited to—if not actually dictated by—the needs
of the third party information user. This is easily achieved when the
owner is the only information user. The method used in financial
records to classify items such as income and expense and value of
13
assets can be idiosyncratic to the owner. The detective-auditor need
only confirm internal consistency in accordance with the owner’s
accounting methods, not those set by anyone else.
3.

Employment as Motivation and the Approval Bias

What motivations can we expect auditors to have and what
temptations will they face? Given the premise that regulation of
something as complex as auditing must take incentives into account,
I will, throughout this Article, address literature on behavioral
studies. Biases specific to auditors have been the subject of a series of
14
psychological studies. If auditors predictably can be expected to
exhibit particular tendencies in their review of accounts, a good
regulatory scheme should take those tendencies into account. Such a
scheme should try to set up incentives that fight these biases; it
should certainly refrain from creating incentives that encourage
auditors to be biased.
We start with the incentives of the auditor who plays the role of
detective for the client. So far, I have painted a rosy picture of the
detective auditor, but certainly the detective auditor is not immune
from bias. There may be agency problems such that the auditor puts
his or her own interests above those of the client. Auditors might be
lazy, accept bribes, or become overly friendly with the people they are
supposed to monitor, thereby clouding their judgment and
succumbing to “self-serving bias,” in which their judgment is

13

STAUB, supra note 11, at 10–11.
Max H. Bazerman et al., Why Good Accountants Do Bad Audits, 80 HARV. BUS.
REV. 97, 100–01 (2002). For an extensive discussion of biases and application to
auditing, see Robert Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A Behavioral Insight into
Securities Fraud Litigation, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 133, 141–71 (2000) [hereinafter Prentice,
The Case of the Irrational Auditor].
14
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15

influenced by their self-interest. In this, however, auditors are no
different from any other employees or contract professionals.
Many auditors’ biases identified in behavioral studies literature
involve modern disclosure auditing rather than traditional detectivestyle auditing. One of the biases, the “approval bias,” is already
present, however, even when auditors are asked solely to do detective
work. The “approval” bias refers to the tendency of people to
approve judgments that others have made. That is, auditors are likely
to approve accounts generated by others even if they themselves
16
would have analyzed the figures in a less favorable manner. Notably,
this bias is not inherent in the relationship between traditional
detective-style auditors and their clients. Indeed, if anything, the
detective-auditor may seek to please the client by being overly harsh,
which mitigates the approval bias.
In short, the detective-auditor–client relationship is relatively
straightforward. Audit clients are business owners who will use the
auditor’s report themselves and who want the truth. As employees or
contractors of this owner, auditors can please the client by being
candid; auditors have no particular incentives derived from the
auditor–client role itself to act otherwise.
B. Auditing for Special-Purpose Disclosure
1.

The Auditor as Certifier

A second role for auditors developed during the last century.
Although auditors continued to do internal auditing, companies also
asked them to certify financial information for disclosure to third
parties, such as banks and sector regulators. Auditors certifying
information for third-party disclosure have departed from the old
role of doing detective work for the client. Now, as far as the client is
concerned, the auditor’s function is to approve the information, not
scrutinize it.
The third party receiving the information has a different
interest. It wants the information to be accurate, and it relies on the
auditor’s certification as an indication of accuracy. With regard to
the third party information user, the auditor is considered a
gatekeeper, that is, a “reputational intermediar[y] who provide[s]

15

Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor, supra note 14, at 168–70; Robert A.
Prentice, Enron: A Brief Behavioral Autopsy, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 417, 428 (2003)
[hereinafter Prentice, Enron: A Brief Behavioral Autopsy].
16
See Prentice, Enron: A Brief Behavioral Autopsy, supra note 15, at 423–25.
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verification and certification services to investors.” The third party’s
reliance on the auditor as gatekeeper is induced by the auditor’s
reputation for professional skill and integrity. In economic terms,
the company hiring an auditor to certify its financial disclosure
18
“rents” the auditor’s good reputation. The theory of certification
auditing is that this reputational bond is reliable because it is too
valuable as a professional asset to sacrifice for the interest of any
19
single client.
In addition to relying on the auditor’s reputational bond, the
third party can take its own steps to understand the quality of the
disclosed information and seek to have it improved. For instance, the
third party can insist that the disclosing entity provide additional
information or quality assurances by threatening to withhold desired
accommodations such as lending or regulatory approval.
2.

Third-Party Accounting Standards

If, as discussed above, it is helpful for financial information to be
presented in a form suitable to the needs of the information user
(rather than the information discloser), then logic dictates that the
third party (who is requiring the audit) set the accounting standards.
This would mean that certification auditing would involve seeing that
a company’s financial records live up to an extrinsic standard
20
dictated by others.
Regulatory agencies in fact did promulgate such standards. In
1906, the Interstate Commerce Commission set uniform standards
21
for railroad accounting.
State and municipal regulation of
electricity, natural gas, street railways, and other public utilities,
which began early in the century, also included requirements for
22
accounting.
World War I excess profits and war profits taxes
23
encouraged depreciation of asset purchases over time, requiring
auditors to examine how the depreciation had been calculated.
Firms that provided war material under cost-plus contracts needed to
17

John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid,” 57
BUS. LAW. 1403, 1405 (2002) [hereinafter Coffee, It’s About the Gatekeepers].
18
Theodore Eisenberg & Jonathan R. Macey, Was Arthur Andersen Different?: An
Empirical Examination of Major Accounting Firms’ Audits of Large Clients,
1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 263 (2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=468761.
19
Id.
20
STAUB, supra note 11, at 11, 89.
21
See id. at 15.
22
Id. at 34–35.
23
Id. at 13.
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identify their costs, further presenting complex judgments for
24
The Federal Reserve Bank enunciated an
auditors to review.
auditing standard when it directed auditors to examine inventory and
accounts receivable of borrowers from member banks, rather than
25
simply relying on the owners’ valuation.
There was an exception to this practice of agencies setting the
accounting standards. In the case of regulated street railways,
accountants successfully lobbied to be the ones to set the standards
that would be acceptable to the regulators. Interestingly, in a series
of 1941 lectures at the Harvard Business School, a leading accountant
advanced the argument for standards set by accountants, rather than
government. He detailed a number of technical reasons why
government accounting standards were unworkable and why the
street railway standards were better. He noted that railroad and
utility regulators later abandoned the standards they had set
themselves and turned to standards recommended by the
26
accountants.
Logic suggests that accountants are best suited to set accounting
standards. They can use their professional expertise to design
systems that present financial information in a useful form for third
parties. It must be kept in mind, however, that standards invariably
skew results. If standard-setters are not themselves the third party
information users, they may have incentives to design standards that
do not best serve users’ interests. As will be discussed in Part II.B,
standard setting and the possibility of distortion is an important and
controversial issue in current securities disclosure auditing.
3.

Reputation as Motivation and the Attachment Bias

In certification auditing, incentives become more complicated.
The auditor no longer enjoys the simplicity of working for a client (a
business owner) who also represents the only user of the financial
information (which concerns the management of the owner’s assets).
Rather, the client is the discloser of the information. The user of the
information is a third party. The client and the information user
seek different things from the audit.
The information user has reason to hope the audit will be
candid—the same sort of audit that the owner employing a detective
27
auditor demands. The auditor’s responsibility to this information
24
25
26
27

Id. at 14.
Id. at 10–11.
See STAUB, supra note 11, at 16–21.
See discussion supra Part I.A.1.
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user is, however, limited. An information user who can prove that
the auditor failed “to exercise reasonable care or competence in
obtaining or communicating the information” can recover damages
28
from the auditor on a theory of negligent misrepresentation. To
recover, however, the plaintiff must show that the auditor negligently
certified the information, knowing it was being supplied for a
particular third party’s benefit and that the third party relied on the
29
negligently certified information to its detriment.
On the other hand, the auditor’s client has more subtle
incentives. It wants the auditor to catch errors that the third party
might find anyway, since a suspicious third party can challenge the
financial data it has received, whether formally as in a utility rate
setting procedure, or informally as when banks ask questions and
demand back-up documentation from would-be borrowers. The
client, however, has no reason to insist that its auditor correct more
subtle, hard-to-detect distortions in information presentation if those
distortions depict the client in a good light. To the contrary, it has
reason to want the auditor to approve such distortions.
What should the auditor do? Personal ethics and professional
30
standards may provide a reason for the auditor to do the sort of
candid audit that helps the information user. More germane to this
discussion, auditors have a self-interested incentive to abide by
professional ethics inasmuch as they wish to achieve a reputation for
professional integrity. As noted, this is a valuable economic asset
worth protecting by continuing to do good work. The auditor,
however, also faces powerful contrary incentives to do the sort of less
candid audit that the client might prefer. “The reality is that
31
reputation means precious little if a firm has no clients.” Thus,
28

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977).
Id.; see also Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 752–60 (Cal. 1992)
(discussing different state-law treatments of auditor liability to third parties); Glenn
K. Jackson, Inc. v. Roe, 273 F.3d 1192, 1200 (9th Cir. 2001).
30
The professional standards of the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (“AICPA”) provide:
A distinguishing mark of a profession is acceptance of its responsibility
to the public. The accounting profession’s public consists of clients,
credit grantors, governments, employers, investors, the business and
financial community, and others who rely on the objectivity and
integrity of certified public accountants to maintain the orderly
functioning of commerce. This reliance imposes a public interest
responsibility on certified public accountants. The public interest is
defined as the collective well-being of the community of people and
institutions the profession serves.
AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT § 53.01 (1988).
31
Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor, supra note 14, at 204.
29
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reputation is constantly pitted against the need to gain and retain
business. Accounting firms, in fact, do risk their reputations for
business reasons. For example, in the mid-1990s, some of the thenBig Six accounting firms were caught charging their regular fees for
tax preparation work actually done by low-paid, part-time and
32
temporary workers.
If it were terribly important to protect
reputation, the savings would not have been worth the risk (which
materialized) of being found out.
There is also an unconscious desire to please one’s client that
33
researchers have identified as the “attachment” bias. In different
studies, both professional auditors and business students interpreted
financial information differently depending on the interests of the
34
“client” they were told to pretend they worked for. In a 2002 study
(post-Enron), experimenters asked 193 auditors working for a major
United States accounting firm to review ambiguous sets of financial
information from Company X. Those told to assume that X was their
client were thirty percent more likely to approve the accounting than
those playing the role of auditors hired by someone thinking of
35
doing business with X.
In another study, business students were given information
about another fictional company and divided into four role-play
groups: those selling the company, the sellers’ auditors, those buying
it, and the buyers’ auditors. The “sellers’ auditors” valued the
company higher than did the “buyers’ auditors.”
The researchers then asked the students to step out of the
assigned roles and simply figure out what the company was actually
36
worth. Strikingly, students were not able to cast off the biases of
their earlier roles. Those who had previously taken the part of
sellers’ auditors still said it was worth more, and those who had played
the buyers’ auditors said it was worth less. The difference was
significant.
Even when an actual reward (extrinsic to the
experiment) was offered for the best impartial estimate, the different
37
estimates of the company’s value did not change. This suggests that
working for a client not only can create a tendency for an auditor to
make judgment calls that favor the client, but that this inclination is
hard to cast off.
32

Id. at 203–04.
Certification auditors also face the approval bias inherent in reviewing
someone else’s work. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
34
Bazerman et al., supra note 14, at 97.
35
Id. at 100–01.
36
Id. at 100.
37
Id.
33
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II. DEALING WITH TWO MASTERS:
THE DILEMMA OF THE “INDEPENDENT” AUDITOR
With the passage of the federal securities acts in 1933 and 1934,
a third role for auditors arose, namely the review and certification of
financial information disclosed by public corporations. This new role
effectively caused auditors to have to answer to two masters with
conflicting interests.
A. The Auditor as Certifier and Detective
The regulation of securities disclosure auditing must be viewed
in its context as part of the general system of federal regulation of
securities. The system’s most basic goal is nothing less than a healthy,
productive economy in which resources are allocated to their best
uses. This is achieved not by centralized planning, but by the
protection and promotion of free, efficient capital markets so that
38
resource allocation results from myriad individual decisions. Unlike
earlier state Blue Sky laws, federal law does not try to regulate
securities offerings on the merits. Shares can be sold regardless of
the issuer’s business plan, however unlikely the business is to succeed.
Investors are free to take risks, even very great ones.
Regulation simply seeks to ensure that investors have the ability
to know what they are getting into.
The law requires that
39
corporations selling shares to the public (“issuers” ), make
substantial disclosure of financial information to the public both
when shares are first offered for sale, and continually thereafter, for
as long as shares are traded on regulated exchanges. Just as investors
privately make investment decisions and issuers privately disclose
information, so too independent auditors privately certify the quality
of the information. This practice contrasts with, for instance, grain
inspection, where the U.S. Department of Agriculture, not the farmer
40
or grain elevator operator, certifies grade and fitness.
The public uses this audited information in two distinct ways. In
one sense, the “public” is a third party, analogous to lenders,
regulatory agencies, and others who might deal with the corporation.
Potential investors review the public financial data to decide whether
they want to buy the corporation’s shares and, if so, at what price.
But in another sense, the disclosure serves a completely different
38

See, e.g., Paul G. Mahoney, The Political Economy of the Securities Act of 1933, 30 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 30–31 (2001).
39
15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(4) (2000).
40
7 U.S.C. § 79(a) (2000) (section heading—”Grain required to be officially
inspected”).
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“public,” namely those who already own the corporation’s shares.
With regard to this group, public financial disclosure is analogous to
internal reports created by managers of businesses for the benefit of
the business owners. Because share ownership is so widely disbursed,
this disclosure must be public. Even if information were only
disclosed to shareholders, it would almost certainly become public at
some point.
In preparing financial information, the distinction between
these two information uses is generally ignored. It even seems a bit
silly. Through a call to a broker or a few computer keystrokes, a
shareholder can become a non-shareholder, or vice versa, in the
blink of an eye. Obviously, corporations cannot, and thus do not,
provide different financial information to each group.
When it comes to auditing, however, this distinction is critical.
Inasmuch as the corporation as a whole is disclosing information to
third parties (potential shareholders), the auditor–client relationship
is analogous to certification auditing. The corporation hires the
auditor and has reason to want deferential certification auditing, with
judgment calls that favor the corporation. The third party is left to
challenge the information if it can. But, inasmuch as the information
constitutes the report of corporate management to the owners
(actual shareholders), the auditor–client relationship is analogous to
detective auditing. The auditor should be reporting to the owner
and providing a thorough, candid review of the books kept by
management.
Auditing regulation has suffered from the failure to recognize
this conceptual distinction. On the one hand, the law provides that
corporations hire their own auditors, which creates an auditor–client
relationship that triggers the incentives of certification auditing—the
corporation wants a deferential audit to induce the third parties to
deal with it on favorable terms. What has not been appreciated is
that this “certification auditing” only makes sense when the third
party is strong and able to challenge the data on its own. Members of
the investing public, however, do not have the requisite strength and
ability. Instead, they rely on the auditor to challenge the quality of
the data and not merely to provide a deferential certification. The
regulatory purpose of the securities laws demands that auditors act like
detectives so that investors will have good information to use as the
basis for their decisions. The Supreme Court put this succinctly when
it called the auditor the “public’s watchdog.” The regulatory structure,
however, gives the auditor a principal with incentive not to want
detective auditing. Thus, the structure is in conflict with the purpose.
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Though the original regulatory structure was the same as that
used in certification auditing, it was more or less suited for providing
the necessary detective auditing for a number of years. Changes in
business and accounting practice, however, provided incentives for
auditors to defer to their clients’ interests while flexible accounting
standards provided the means by allowing auditors to certify that a
broad spectrum of financial disclosure complied with the required
GAAP. These factors contributed to, if not caused, the auditing
scandals of 2000–2001. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 made a
number of reforms and attempted to give the auditor a principal with
the proper incentives to demand detective auditing. Nevertheless, it
does not change the basic structure with its mismatched incentives.
Therefore, further reform is necessary.
1.

The Original Certification Model of Securities
Disclosure Auditing

Under the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts, an issuer’s shares can
be sold or traded on a regulated U.S. stock exchange only if the
Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”) first approves a prospectus
containing financial statements, and the company continues to
disclose financial information in annual and quarterly reports. All of
41
these statements must be audited by “independent accountants.”
The basic pre-Sarbanes-Oxley securities regulation scheme
contains a number of ways to preserve the independence of these
certification auditors. First, as certified public accountants, auditors
remain subject to state regulation and to professional discipline
through professional organizations and peer review.
Second,
42
auditors must be formally independent. They may not share family
ties, material financial interests, or common employees with the
43
audited corporation. Third, the law gives the SEC the ability to play
the role that the strong third party plays in standard certification
auditing. It can review and question suspicious information. When
an issuer sells shares to the public for the first time, the SEC is in a
very strong position. The issuer cannot sell its shares until the SEC
44
approves the prospectus. Once shares begin trading, however, the

41

15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, 77j, 77aa(26), 78m(a) (Supp. II 2002); 17 C.F.R. § 229.302
(2005).
42
The defined term “auditor” refers to both individual accountants who conduct
an audit and their firms. 17 C.F.R. § 210.2–01.
43
Id.
44
15 U.S.C. § 77f.
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SEC need not approve in advance the financial disclosures, but may
conduct ex post facto review.
The private incentives of corporations and auditors helped to
make this system work in two respects. First, auditors commonly
practiced on their own or in small firms. Their professional
reputations for quality auditing were too valuable to destroy by
acquiescing in the misleading disclosure of any single client. They
had a financial incentive to stand firm. Second, audited corporations
had an incentive not to push their auditors too hard because the
auditor might quit. Under SEC regulations, if an auditor is dismissed
or resigns, the corporation must disclose that fact with an
45
explanation.
Auditors willing to risk losing a client rather than
compromising their standards can have some clout. Some studies
have shown that while a “qualified” auditor’s opinion has little effect
46
on share prices, a change in auditor can result in lower prices, and
could possibly incite an SEC investigation.
2.

Strains on the Regulatory System Skew the Incentives

As technology and the economy evolved over the past seventyplus years, this regulatory system became less able to ensure the
independence of auditors or give them the incentive to be
watchdogs.
For one thing, the underlying economic activity described in
financial statements has changed drastically since 1934. Public
companies are far bigger, creating more financial information to deal
with, especially since the advent of computers. “Audit engagement
teams” from accounting firms increasingly work for just a few audit
47
clients, or sometimes just one.
For instance, Andersen’s lead
48
partner on the Enron account worked only for Enron. Additionally,
the change from an industrial to an information-based economy
created new problems in basic accounting and therefore in the
auditing that controlled the quality of the accounting. Using
established methods, accountants could confidently audit records of
companies whose assets were mostly physical plant and inventory and
whose businesses functioned according to predictable cycles (e.g.,
complete the “work in progress,” sell it, collect accounts receivable,

45

17 C.F.R. § 229.304.
Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor, supra note 14, at 207–08.
47
Eisenberg & Macey, supra note 18, at 269.
48
Jonathan R. Macey & Hillary A. Sale, Observations on the Role of Commodification,
Independence, and Governance in the Accounting Industry, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1167, 1170
(2003).
46
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etc.). Now, many assets are intangible, such as projections of future
income streams. Their present value is speculative and sensitive to
assumptions made by management, making it “extremely difficult,
even for a well-intentioned auditor, to dispute and reject the
projection of a manager wishing to improve the appearance of his
49
financial statements.”
The accounting profession also changed radically, in a way that
compromised the ability of the regulatory scheme to protect the
independence of auditors from their clients. Reputation has lost its
central position, and auditors’ financial independence from their
clients has eroded. The story in a nutshell is that, like lawyers,
accountants and auditors were once protected from price
competition by professional association rules against advertising,
50
soliciting rival firms’ clients, or bidding for business. Firms engaged
in only partial competition, but that competition was in the areas of
quality and reputation, a basic premise of certification auditing. In
the 1970s, however, the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (AICPA) dropped the restrictive rules in response to
51
threatened federal antitrust action. This created price competition.
The competition eventually led to concentration in the Big Eight,
Seven, Six, etc.
The Big Four accounting firms now control more than 60% of
52
the U.S. market for all accounting services.
This dominance,
however, is far more striking in the field of auditing. A 2003 General
Accounting Office (“GAO”) study (mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act) found that the companies for which the Big Four do the
53
auditing represent over 99% of all public company sales. The Big
54
Four audit all companies with annual sales of $5 billion or more. Of
the companies with sales between $250 million and $5 billion, the Big

49

Joshua Ronen, Financial Statement Insurance, 4 J. FORENSIC ACCT. 1 (2003),
available at http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~jronen/articles/Journal%20of%20Forensic
%20Accounting.doc.
50
Weil, Behind Wave of Corporate Fraud, supra note 10, at A14.
51
Id.
52
Eisenberg & Macey, supra note 18, at 293. Given the high degree of industry
concentration, the authors question the wisdom of the decision to prosecute Arthur
Andersen for obstruction of justice. Id. at 293–94. They noted that in 1997, when
Andersen was still in business, the four-firm concentration ratio for public company
auditing was 71%. Id. at 294. This figure rose to 99% in 2002, after Andersen’s
demise. Id.
53
Id.
54
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRMS: MANDATED STUDY ON
CONSOLIDATION AND COMPETITION 105, available at www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO03-864 [hereinafter GAO STUDY].
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55

Four audit 97%. The GAO report concluded that there are “no
56
significant competitors” for large-company auditing.
In other words, though big corporations depend on the Big
Four for auditing, the Big Four do not depend on their auditing
business, the importance of which to accounting firms has
diminished relative to other services. The flat-fee audit pricing
increasingly popular in the 1970s and 1980s drove down what
accounting firms could earn from auditing. There is some evidence
that the perceived need to keep audit costs down resulted in lower
quality auditing, particularly as big firms turned to “risk-based”
auditing in which auditors focus on what they anticipated would be
problem areas, and relied more on management’s data for
presumably low-error areas like cash on the balance sheet. If the
auditor’s initial risk assessment is wrong, however, significant
57
problems may be missed.
Another threat to audit quality came from the other services
offered by accounting firms. Why should this be so? With auditing
less profitable, firms turned to other sources of revenue. They built
up their consulting businesses, offering clients numerous other
services, including outsourcing internal audit work, tax accounting,
58
and designing computerized financial information systems.
Whereas in 1981, fees for management advisory services and similar
services provided thirteen percent of revenue for the Big Five
accounting firms, by 2000, they provided some fifty percent of
59
revenue.
By 2002, according to one study, companies paid their
accounting firms an average of three times for non-audit services
60
what they paid the same firm for audit services.
Given this
distribution of revenue, the income and career prospects of

55

Eisenberg & Macey, supra note 18, at 293.
GAO STUDY, supra note 54, at 21.
57
Jonathan Weil, Fannie Paid Little for Its Audits, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 2004, at C1,
C3 (describing “risk-based auditing,” in which auditors give only a cursory review to
areas of accounting perceived to have little danger of fraud or error, such as cash on
the balance sheet).
58
Weil, Behind Wave of Corporate Fraud, supra note 10, at A14.
59
See Revision of the Commission’s Auditor Independence Requirements, 65
Fed. Reg. 43,148 & 43,153 n.49 (July 12, 2000) (proposing rules subsequently
codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.2-01 & 240.14a-101); Mark Allan Worden, Securities
Regulation: Protecting Auditor Independence from Non-Audit Services—An Evolving
Standard, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 513, 516–17 (2002).
60
Coffee, It’s About the Gatekeepers, supra note 17, at 1411.
56
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accountants working in auditing came to depend less on their
61
reputations for high-quality auditing and more on their billings.
Furthermore, an unintended regulatory consequence of the
growth of non-auditing business was to hand audit clients a powerful
weapon. As noted, the original regulatory scheme protected auditor
independence by requiring disclosure whenever a change in auditor
62
occurred. Thus, if an auditor insisted that financial statements be
changed before signing off on them, a corporation would probably
listen because if not, the audit firm would publicly resign as auditor.
With the growth of consulting services, however, corporations no
longer had to either adhere to the auditor’s recommendations or
explain why the auditor resigned. Instead, they had a third choice—
to threaten to stop buying lucrative non-audit services from the
auditor’s firm. Such a threat had teeth since it could be carried out
in secret. Changes in non-audit service providers did not need to be
63
revealed. In June 2000, the SEC tried to address this problem by
substantially restricting the ability of accounting firms to perform
non-audit services for a client while the firm was, at the same time,
auditing its financial statements for public disclosure. The proposed
rule, however, weakened after a “bruising battle” with accounting
64
firms and corporations.
Regulatory
action
or
private
lawsuits
could
have
counterbalanced the increased pressures for auditors to simply
certify, rather than scrutinize, their clients’ financial information.
Both of these external monitors, however, lost power. The SEC failed
to keep up with the changing economy in terms of its institutional
capacity. Between 1991 and 2000, financial statements and other
corporate filings increased by nearly 60%, but the SEC’s staff
available to review them grew by only 29% and its legal and
65
investigative staff by 16%. In another measure, annual volume of
61

Id. at 1415.
See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
63
Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the
Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1237–38
(2002).
64
The Enron Debacle and Gatekeeper Liability: Why Would the Gatekeepers Remain
Silent?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science & Transportation, 107th Cong.
3 (2001) (testimony of Prof. John C. Coffee, Jr., et al.), available at http://commerce.
senate.gov/hearings/121801Coffee.pdf [hereinafter Enron Hearings].
65
Human Capital: Major Human Capital Challenges at SEC and Key Trade Agencies:
Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Oversight of Government Management, Restructuring and
the District of Columbia, Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. 3–4 (2002)
(statement of Richard J. Hillman, Director of Financial Markets and Community
Investments, and Loren Yager, Director of International Affairs and Trade, U.S.
62
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trading on exchanges increased almost six-fold from 1993 to 2001,
66
The SEC
while the SEC’s enforcement staff grew by only 15%.
exercised its power to suspend trading of shares only ten to twenty
67
times per year over the last decade.
Some commentators have
68
linked this lax enforcement to Enron and associated scandals.
Liability rules also weakened private investors’ ability to serve as
monitors of corporate auditing. It became harder to recover
damages from the auditors themselves after 1994 when the Supreme
Court held that auditors could not be held liable, under the
69
Securities Acts, for aiding and abetting. That is, auditors are not
liable simply for failing to stop a corporation from making a
misstatement. Instead, auditors themselves must affirmatively do
something that causes investors harm. What constitutes such
affirmative action tends to vary. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit has held that auditors may be liable if they
maintained a “significant role” in drafting or editing a misleading
70
document.
In contrast, the Second and Eleventh Circuits have
imposed auditor liability only if the misleading statement was publicly
attributable to the auditor at the time the injured party decided to
71
invest.
Changes in the level of liability that corporations potentially
incur for issuing misleading disclosures may have made them less
likely to insist on the sort of careful auditing that decreases their
exposure. As a matter of Delaware corporate law, directors have a
fiduciary duty to see that accurate financial information is disclosed
72
to shareholders.
Likewise, under federal securities law, a

General Accounting Office), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d02662t.pdf.
66
Mark Schroeder, SEC Gets a Raise, But Will It Be Enough?, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12,
2002, at C1.
67
Suspensions are reported at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/suspensions.shtml
(last visited Aug. 24, 2005).
68
See Enron Hearings, supra note 64, at 3–4; Roger C. Cramton, Enron and the
Corporate Lawyer: A Primer on Legal and Ethical Issues, 58 BUS. LAW. 143, 181–83 (2002);
see John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic History of the
1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269, 290 (2004).
69
Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
70
Dannenberg v. PaineWebber, Inc. (In re Software Toolworks, Inc. Sec. Litig.),
50 F.3d 615, 628 n.3 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied sub. nom. Montgomery Sec. v.
Dannenberg, 516 U.S. 907 (1995).
71
Ziemba v. Cascade Int’l, Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 1205 (11th Cir. 2001); Wright v.
Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1104
(1999).
72
Anglo American Sec. Fund, L.P. v. S.R. Global Int’l Fund, L.P., 829 A.2d 143,
157 (Del. Ch. 2003) (“Under Delaware law, fiduciaries are required, at the very least,
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corporation is liable for damages if its financial disclosure is defective,
and third parties can prove that, in making a securities sale or
73
purchase, they relied on the disclosure to their detriment. These
cases became harder to bring and prove in the 1990s. The Private
74
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”) limits attorneys’
75
fees recoverable in class action litigation. It also increases the level
of information that claimants must acquire prior to bringing suit by
requiring claimants to plead the details of suspected fraud with
particularity in the initial complaint, rather than allowing claimants
to plead them generally and flesh them out later with facts learned
76
during pre-trial disclosure. Discovery is now postponed until after a
77
court has determined whether the case may go forward. In 1998,
Congress imposed similar limitations on such cases proceeding in
78
Although some studies show that the number of
state courts.
79
lawsuits and the average size of settlements increased through 2002,
other commentators believe that limits on liability have made
80
misleading financial disclosure more likely.
The upshot of all these changes was to give auditors more
incentives to see their job as one of certification auditing. The
auditor–client relationship in certification auditing gives the auditor
reasons to favor the interest of the client, not the third party
information user (in this case, the public). As discussed above in
Parts I.A.3 and I.B.3, studies have identified a number of relevant
biases: Auditors are prone to approve accounts prepared by managers
even if they would have done them differently themselves (the
“approval” bias) and are prone to identify with their clients’ interest
(“attachment” bias). With the growth of accounting firms and their
81
consulting income, the “self-serving” bias came to the fore. The
individual auditor in a large firm can have a personal interest in
to be honest and truthful when communicating with their principals.” (citing Malone
v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10–11 (Del. 1998)).
73
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10b, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5.
74
Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended by the Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
75
15 U.S.C. § 77z-1 (2000).
76
Id.
77
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B).
78
15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f).
79
Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 33 n.216 (2002).
80
William Lerach, Plundering America: How American Investors Got Taken for Trillions
by Corporate Insiders—The Rise of a New Corporate Kleptocracy, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 69,
77–80 (2002).
81
See Prentice, Enron: A Brief Behavioral Autopsy, supra note 15, at 428.
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keeping a client happy, so that the firm can retain both the audit and
the substantial non-auditing business.
Non-audit services also change the auditor’s psychological work
environment. If an accounting firm’s only connection with a
company is the audit, the external auditor’s relations with corporate
employees may be somewhat distant and formal even if corporate
headquarters pays the audit fee. This formality can erode if the same
auditors come back year after year, which is a reason to require
auditors and audit firms to rotate. When the accounting firm also
does non-audit work, however, the firm and the corporate employees
are on the same “team,” working together for the good of the
corporation. Auditors may find this “team” mentality hard to ignore.
B. The Trap of Flexible Accounting Standards
Accounting standards are vital to certification auditing because
the third party information user needs some way to evaluate the
information received. They are particularly important in securities
disclosure auditing. A large number of investors use financial
information to assess a multitude of investment opportunities. These
investors need to know they are comparing apples to apples. This
calls for clear, firm standards. Given the complexity of modern
corporations, however, accounting standards must contain sufficient
flexibility to cover a variety of circumstances.
Historically, standard-setting in securities financial disclosure
auditing took the same path as standard-setting in regulatory
certification auditing. The 1934 Securities Exchange Act authorized
the SEC, as the representative of the public, to set accounting
82
standards, though it did not direct the agency to do so. The SEC, in
fact, has never set accounting standards. Instead, it followed the lead
of the street railway regulators and deferred to standards set by
accountants. Thus, in 1938, the SEC issued an “Accounting Series
Release” directing that financial disclosure statements should follow
83
accounting principles that have “substantial authoritative support.”
The SEC now recognizes the GAAP standards issued by the Financial
84
Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”) as having such support.
If the regulatory structure has given auditors the incentives to
favor their clients with deferential certification auditing, then the
82

15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform
(And It Might Just Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 945 (2003) [hereinafter Cunningham,
Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn].
84
See, e.g., Greenstone v. Cambex Corp., 975 F.2d 22, 24 (1st Cir. 1992).
83
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accounting standards have provided the means. There are two ways
in which the system is susceptible to influence. The first is in the way
the rules are made. Before the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, FASB, the
standard-setter, received half of its funding from the large accounting
firms. Studies suggest that accounting firms tried to influence the
timing and content of accounting standards in ways that favored their
85
clients. For instance, because of the development of new financial
vehicles and business forms, it was important in the 1990s for FASB to
be able to move quickly in establishing new standards. FASB
politicking, however, sometimes delayed this. Notoriously, the
extremely important FASB standard for accounting for derivatives
86
was debated and delayed for four years. Sarbanes-Oxley addresses
these abuses. It requires that FASB (or any successor) be funded
solely by corporations’ audit support fees or risk losing recognition as
87
a private standard-setter.
Further, FASB board members cannot
belong to accounting firms while they are serving on the board or for
88
the preceding two years. Finally, FASB must “promptly” consider
89
rule changes through majority vote.
The second problem with GAAP is more intractable. Given the
extreme complexity of the underlying economic activity, standards
90
maintain significant flexibility.
Consequently, if a variety of
psychological and economic factors provide managers with the
85

Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor, supra note 14, at 205 & n.410; see also
ARTHUR LEVITT, TAKE ON THE STREET: WHAT WALL STREET AND CORPORATE AMERICAN
DON’T WANT YOU TO KNOW 111–15 (2002).
86
CONFERENCE BD. COMM’N ON PUB. TRUST & PRIVATE ENTER., FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS:
CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
41
(2003),
available
at
http://www.conference-board.org/pdf_free/757.pdf.
87
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 108(b), 15 U.S.C. § 7218(b) (Supp. II 2002).
88
15 U.S.C. § 7218(b)(1)(A)(ii).
89
15 U.S.C. § 7218(b)(1)(A)(iv).
90
Lawrence A. Cunningham, Sharing Accounting’s Burden: Business Lawyers in
Enron’s Dark Shadows, 57 BUS. LAW. 1421 (2002) [hereinafter Cunningham, Sharing
Accounting’s Burden]. Cunningham states:
Untutored lawyers sometimes face arguments from seasoned
counterparts that a position is necessary or desirable because it accords
with GAAP. The unwashed may find this stance convincing, but it
invariably is not. GAAP’s conventions authorize a wide variety of
treatments for identical economic events, from relatively standard
contexts such as inventory and depreciation to more challenging
contexts such as derivatives and leases. Accounting requires choices
and judgments entailing substantial subjectivity, making compliance
with GAAP insufficient. It rarely mandates particular treatments and
by no means forecloses massaging numbers, or even committing fraud.
Seasoned advocates working with accounting data know this about
GAAP.
Id. at 1435.
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motivation to distort financial reports and auditors with the
motivation to approve those reports, then the flexible accounting
standards may not stand in the way.
Recall that when an auditor certifies a financial statement, he or
she is really saying that it “present[s] fairly, in all material respects,
the financial position of [X Corporation] . . . in conformity with
91
generally accepted accounting principles.”
This formulation is
already somewhat ambiguous: It does not simply aver that the
statements are a fair picture but rather that they are a fair picture
according to GAAP. Taken as a formal system, GAAP has seven broad
principles at its core that certainly require fair reporting. But in an
effort to provide predictability and comparability among reports,
these principles have become the center of a web of more than 140
Statements of Financial Accounting Standards and thousands of
92
Interpretations and Technical Bulletins. The resulting system is not
only complex, but provides numerous ways to account for even
common items such as inventory and depreciation as well as exotic
93
ones such as derivatives.
Additionally, while GAAP was designed to be responsive to the
actual needs of auditors, accountants, and companies, it also has the
capacity to cause a race to the bottom when it comes to quality of
disclosure. It invites companies to follow each other’s lead, rather
than adhere to some fixed standard. “GAAP” stands for “Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles.” For example, if common practice is
to fail to disclose executive stock options as a future contingent
liability, why should a company put itself at a competitive
94
disadvantage by being one of a minority that does disclose?
91

Prohs, supra note 6, at 493 & n.108.
The California Supreme Court has called GAAP
an amalgam of statements issued by the AICPA through the successive
groups it has established to promulgate accounting principles: the
Committee on Accounting Procedure, the Accounting Principles
Board, and the Financial Accounting Standards Board. . . . GAAP
include broad statements of accounting principles amounting to
aspirational norms as well as more specific guidelines and illustrations.
The lack of an official compilation allows for some debate of whether
particular announcements are encompassed within GAAP. . . . One
standard book purporting to comprehensively restate GAAP includes
90 major sections and more than 500 pages.
Biley v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 750–51 (Cal. 1992) (citations omitted).
93
Cunningham, Sharing Accounting’s Burden, supra note 90, at 1435.
94
See, e.g., Robert H. Frank, The Case for Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2002, at
A13 (“[T]he standards defining acceptable accounting judgments depend on
context. When almost all companies issue optimistic earnings reports, such reports
come to be viewed as normal. Even the most cautious executives then feel pressure
92
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The upshot of this is that managers can tell their financial story
in a favorable way and auditors can legitimately defer to it because of
the many different treatments supported by GAAP. Managers of
some corporations that crashed in the 1990s were simply mistaken in
their optimistic projections about things like the value of leases or
accounts receivable; as discussed above in Part II.A.2, these
information-based assets are hard to value.
Other managers,
however, engaged in “creative compliance,” in that they followed
GAAP formally while in fact evading the duties that the rules, taken as
95
a whole, impose.
An Enron company manual was explicit in
preferring technical compliance with GAAP to reporting of economic
reality: “Reported earnings follow the rules and principles of
accounting. The results do not always create measures consistent
with underlying economics. However, corporate management’s
performance is generally measured by accounting income, not
underlying economics. Risk management strategies are therefore directed at
96
accounting rather than economic performance.”
To cite just one example, GAAP rules allow use of the offbalance-sheet Special Purpose Entities (“SPE”) as long as three
percent of the ownership is not in the parent corporation. Enron
employed this device misleadingly to transfer debt off its balance
97
sheet via some three thousand SPEs. This sort of thing suggests that
far from serving the needs of the third party information users (the
public), the accounting standards sometimes positively disserved the
public by making deception easier.
C. What Recent Scandals Tell Us About the Divergent Role of Auditors
As discussed in Parts II.A.2 and II.B, by the late 1990s, several
factors were in place that increased the risk that companies would
promulgate misleading financial disclosure: complex informationbased businesses, consolidation in the accounting profession,
to report their earnings even more optimistically, in turn creating room for their
more aggressive counterparts to push the envelope further.”).
95
Doreen McBarnet & C.J. Whelan, Creative Compliance and the Defeat of Legal
Control: The Magic of the Orphan Subsidiary, in THE HUMAN FACE OF LAW 179, 183–93
(Keith Hawkins ed., 1997).
96
Enron Corp. Risk Management Manual, quoted in Frank Partnoy, A Revisionist
View of Enron and the Sudden Death of “May,” 48 VILL. L. REV. 1245, 1248–49 & n.15
(2003) (emphasis added).
97
See Coffee, It’s About the Gatekeepers, supra note 17, at 1404 & n.4; see also Partnoy,
supra note 96 (arguing that financial derivatives, “such as options, futures and other
contracts whose value is linked to some underlying financial instrument or index”
were more important to Enron’s collapse than were transactions with Special
Purpose Entities).
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conflicts of interest within accounting firms between auditing and
non-audit consulting services, a weakened SEC, increased protection
of auditors and their clients from liability for misleading financial
disclosure, and finally, flexible accounting standards that gave room
for bias to operate. At the same time, stock prices seemed to be
going only up during the late 1990s; it was tempting to think that the
New Economy did not follow the old business rules, such as the need
to link profits and high share prices. This bubble burst in spring
2000.
Was misleading financial disclosure to blame for the bubble and
the collapse? If what fuelled the long stock market rise of the 1990s
was the “irrational exuberance” of investors willing—if not rushing—
to speculate, then no amount of good financial information could
98
have helped. Investors would have ignored it. On the other hand, it
is undisputed that many corporations did disclose financial
statements inflated by creative accounting, and it is commonly held
that these induced some amount of investment. The former chief
accountant of the SEC estimated that between 1995 and 2001, faulty
99
audits cost investors some $100 billion.
Though investors may have brought some of their woes upon
themselves, it also seems clear that they failed to receive “watch-dog”
protection from auditors. In many instances, auditors’ certifications
were not a sign of quality financial disclosure. One indication of this
is the large number of times corporations restated their disclosed
financial statements after the discovery of accounting irregularities.
For example, a key event in the collapse of Enron was the fall 2001
restatement of net income relating back to 1997, a $586 million
100
reduction.
According to a report by the GAO, there were 92
101
restatements in 1997, more than doubling to 225 by 2001.
Furthermore, not just small or new companies issued financial
restatements, but large, established ones did so as well. In 1997, the
average market capitalization of a company issuing a restatement was
102
$500 million. By 2001, it had risen to $2 billion.
Notably, some of the most scandal-ridden corporations, Enron,
Global Crossing, Qwest, and WorldCom, all used the large and
respected firm of Arthur Andersen as outside auditor. At WorldCom,
98

Coffee, It’s About the Gatekeepers, supra note 17, at 1412.
Jane Mayer, The Accountants’ War, NEW YORKER, Apr. 22, 2002, at 64, 68.
100
LEVITT, supra note 85, at 141.
101
U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, FINANCIAL STATEMENT RESTATEMENTS: TRENDS, MARKET
IMPACTS, REGULATORY RESPONSES, AND REMAINING CHALLENGES 4, available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03138.pdf (Oct. 2002).
102
Id. at 17.
99
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Andersen failed to report that management foiled an internal control
system and recorded expenses as assets. At Qwest, it approved
reports reflecting cash “earned” from swaps of telephone capacity
103
that involved no cash. Andersen’s eventually fatal problem was that
its Houston office was entwined with Enron, which provided some
104
twenty-seven percent of that office’s public client audit fees. At one
point, one hundred Andersen employees worked in leased space at
105
Andersen consultants developed the
Enron headquarters.
computer system that generated the information Andersen auditors
would review.
Enron’s president, vice president, and chief
106
accounting officer were all former Andersen employees.
The decline and precipitous fall of Enron is well known. In
2000, it was the seventh largest company in the United States, with
share prices reaching $90.56. The prices began to plummet in 2001
amid revelations that Enron created paper profits through
transactions with its many SPEs. Enron restated its financial
statements; share prices fell further. In December 2001, it entered
Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization. By January 2002, its shares,
107
many held by employees, traded at 36 cents. The collapse led to a
government investigation of Enron, during which Andersen
108
personnel destroyed key documents.
Andersen was convicted of
felony obstruction of justice in June 2002 and dissolved, a disgraceful
109
end to the 89-year-old firm.
Andersen certainly had accountants who were skilled detectives,
yet the firm nonetheless certified Enron’s aggressive accounting. For
instance, Andersen’s professional standards group partner reviewing
the Enron audit complained about the improper recording of some
$150 million in connection with a transaction and commented that
110
“this whole deal looks like there is no substance.” He was, however,

103

Cunningham, Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn, supra note 83, at 932–34.
Krishna G. Palepu & Paul M. Healy, The Fall of Enron, 17 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES
3, 15 (2003).
105
FOX, supra note 1, at 212.
106
Mayer, supra note 99, at 66.
107
Sharon Reece, Enron: The Final Straw & How to Build Pensions of Brick, 41 DUQ.
L. REV. 69, 146 (2002); see also FOX, supra note 1, at xiii, 2; Ribstein, supra note 79, at
5–6.
108
Cunningham, Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn, supra note 83, at 929.
109
FOX, supra note 1, at xiii, 181, 303; see Kathleen F. Brickey, Andersen’s Fall from
Grace, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 917 (2003) (discussing criminal prosecution of Andersen
and the firm’s response).
110
In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 679
(S.D. Tex. 2002).
104
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111

removed from his position. In the securities class action suit filed in
the wake of Enron’s collapse, the court concluded that “[a] number
of surviving Arthur Andersen documents reveal that Arthur Andersen
was concerned about, yet covered up or ignored fraudulent
112
accounting practices by Enron.”
D. Sarbanes-Oxley’s Moderate Reforms
Public outrage at Enron and its sister scandals created unusual
political interest in the arcane area of corporate financial
113
disclosure, resulting in speedy passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
114
2002 in July 2002. Particular reforms important to auditing fall into
four basic categories: oversight of auditors, enhanced enforcement,
auditor independence, and supervision of the audit. Under the Act,
however, corporations still engage their own auditors. As this section
will discuss, Sarbanes-Oxley improved the current situation, but the
basic mis-incentives built into the relationships among the auditor,
the audit client, and the public require more radical reform.
1.

Increased Public Oversight of Auditing

Sarbanes-Oxley establishes the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (“PCAOB”), the first quasi-federal body to become
involved in professional discipline and regulations of auditors and
the promulgation of auditing standards, which were previously left to
the states and to professional self-regulation. PCAOB is a nongovernmental body with five full-time members appointed by the
115
116
SEC, only two of whom may be certified public accountants.
Its
funding comes from an annual “Accounting Support Fee” paid by
111

Id.
Id.
113
Maryland Senator Paul Sarbanes, the Senate sponsor of the legislation, recalled
that much of the testimony taken by the Senate Banking Committee in early 2002 on
corporate financial disclosure was highly technical. One member, he said, did not
realize that there was an open microphone in the vicinity when he confided, “This is
really boring,” to Wyoming Senator Mike Enzi. Senator Enzi, the body’s only
Certified Public Accountant, replied, “It may be boring to you, but I haven’t had this
much fun since I came to the United States Senate.” AM. LAW INST., REMARKS AND
ADDRESSES AT THE 81ST ANNUAL MEETING 48, 53–54 (2004).
114
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); see Cunningham, Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn, supra note 83,
at 917 & n.2.
115
Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 101(a) (establishment), § 101(b) (status) & § 101(e)
(membership), 15 U.S.C. § 7211(a), (b), and (e). The SEC selects PCAOB board
members “after consultation with the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System and the Secretary of the Treasury.” 15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(4).
116
Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 101(e)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(2).
112
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117

corporations.
Among PCAOB’s duties is the duty to conduct
periodic inspections of audit firms (once a year for large firms).
Firms may incur fines or lose the right to audit public disclosure
statements if they violate either the law or the PCAOB’s auditing
118
standards and independence rules.
Can PCAOB provide better auditing? Early indications are
good; evidence suggests that it may be expected to act vigorously. For
119
example, although the PCAOB was initially dubbed “peekaboo,”
and its first chairman nominee withdrew after revelations that he
served on the audit committee of a company charged with mail, wire,
120
and securities fraud, its chief auditor is a former standards writer
121
with a reputation for strictness. PCAOB also broke with the past in
its approach to standard-setting. Congress gave it the option of
delegating auditing and quality control standard-setting to a private
organization (just as the SEC has delegated accounting standard122
setting to FASB).
PCAOB, however, determined to set its own
123
auditing standards.
PCAOB oversight was linked to some twenty-

117

15 U.S.C. § 7219(d)(1).
15 U.S.C. §§ 7212, 7214, 7215.
119
Judith Burns, Accounting Board Tackles Its Mission Amid Initial Laughs: PCAOB,
Known as Peekaboo to Some, Has Oversight of a Troubled Industry, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 2003,
at C5.
120
John Yozzo, The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board Disaster: You Can’t
Make This Stuff Up!, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 2003, at 30, 30.
121
J.D. Glater, Eager to Be the Auditors’ Auditor, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2003; Jerry
Ascierto, New World Order: As the PCAOB Takes Shape, the AICPA’s Role Is Blurred,
CALIFORNIA CPA, June 2003, at 6, available at http://www.findarticles.com (“Douglas
Carmichael, the board’s chief auditor, is an outspoken critic of the AICPA, as well as
the big auditing firms. Carmichael, an accounting professor at Baruch College, once
served as vice president of auditing for the AICPA where he helped develop auditing
standards in the early 1980s.”).
122
15 U.S.C. § 7213(a)(3)(A)(i) (providing that PCAOB may adopt as auditing,
quality control, and ethics standards “any portion of any statement of auditing
standards or other professional standards . . . that were proposed by [one] or more
professional groups of accountants . . . .”).
123
William J. McDonough, The Fourth Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture on Corporate,
Securities & Financial Law, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 583, 596 (2004). In the
words of PCAOB chairman McDonough:
the [Sarbanes-Oxley] Act gave the Board the power to designate or
recognize any professional group of accountants to propose new
standards. However, before I arrived in June, my fellow Board
members determined not to exercise the authority to delegate, but
instead voted to set the standards from within the PCAOB. It was a
decision I heartily endorse and clearly was consistent with the intent of
Congress. As all of you know, in understanding any act of Congress
you have to go look at the legislative history and find out what they
really wanted in addition to what they wound up putting on paper. As
118
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five financial restatements in 2004. Debt classification problems on
one company’s financials prompted examiners to revisit others, in
124
turn prompting those companies to disclose corrected information.
PCAOB oversight, however, in no way changes the incentive structure
of securities disclosure auditing because auditors still work for the
audited corporation. The new oversight gives accounting firms
reason to obey its rules to avoid trouble themselves, but the
countervailing incentive to do an audit favorable to the audit client
remains.
2.

Enhanced Penalties and Enforcement

Additionally, Sarbanes-Oxley increases the threat of legal
enforcement. The SEC now has more muscle—the Act provided a
sixty-three percent increase in funding, including some $98 million
to hire two hundred staff members to oversee auditing. The Agency
now must review disclosure filings systematically and at least once
125
every three years per corporation.
Private liability rules remain
essentially unchanged, but fines or civil fraud liability connected to a
securities purchase or sale can no longer be discharged in
126
bankruptcy.
The securities fraud limitations period has been
127
extended, though Congress resisted calls to repeal the PSLRA,
which, as discussed in Part II.A.2, continues to set a very high
standard for bringing a securities fraud case. Corporate managers
will face increased liability themselves for misleading disclosure.
Chief executive officers and chief financial officers must now certify
personally that their corporation’s disclosed financial reports not
only comply with securities law but “fairly present[ ], in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
128
issuer.” A violation can result in a maximum fine of $1 million and

sometimes happen [sic], we had that option, but we shouldn’t have
used it, and we didn’t.
Id.
124

Diya Gullapalli, To Err Is Human, to Restate Financials, Divine: Companies Redo
Reports in Record Numbers, Partly Due to Sarbanes-Oxley, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 2005, at C3
[hereinafter Gullapalli, To Err is Human, to Restate Financials, Divine].
125
15 U.S.C. § 78kk.
126
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19).
127
The statute of limitations for securities fraud claims was extended from one to
two years after discovery and a maximum of five years (formerly three years) after the
violation. 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b). The earlier limitations period was announced by the
Supreme Court in Lampf v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991) (uniform limitations
period for private securities actions).
128
18 U.S.C. § 1350(b).
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up to ten years in prison, or $5 million and twenty years if the
129
wrongful certification is “willful.”
Will these penalties and enhanced SEC oversight change
corporation’s incentives, so that they demand that their auditors
ensure that financial disclosure is not misleading? It is too soon to
tell. The requirement that CEOs and CFOs certify financial
disclosure was generally effective in November 2004 and has been
linked to a record number of restatements correcting errors in
130
financial statements.
On the other hand, the SEC’s level of
131
commitment to aggressive enforcement of Sarbanes-Oxley may vary.
And, as for the deterrence effect of harsh penalties, it bears
remembering that mail, wire, and securities fraud statutes already
provided significant penalties and prison time at the time of the
scandals, but did not serve as a deterrent to managers at corporations
132
such as Enron and WorldCom.
3.

Stricter Independence Rules—With a Loophole

Furthermore, Sarbanes-Oxley significantly strengthens the rules
encouraging the independence of auditors from their clients. It
makes clear that an accounting firm auditing a corporation may not
also keep the corporation’s books, do its accounting, prepare its
financial statements, or design or implement financial information
systems. It may not conduct appraisals or valuations for the
corporation, perform actuarial services, help outsource the internal
audit, recruit personnel, or provide a variety of services, including
legal or investment advice, investment banking, or brokerage or
133
expert consultation.
Can these rules remove any incentives an accounting firm might
have to soft-peddle an audit report in order to keep consulting
business? Perhaps not. The prohibitions are not hard and fast.
134
Although PCAOB may prohibit additional services by regulation, it
may also exempt any accounting firm, public company, or even a
particular transaction from the independence rules “on a case by case
129

18 U.S.C. § 1350(c).
Gullapalli, To Err is Human, to Restate Financials, Divine, supra note 124, at C3.
131
The SEC has been charged with being both too aggressive in enforcement and
too easy on business interests. See, e.g., Diya Gullapalli, SEC’s Top Accountant Counts on
Not Pleasing Everyone, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2005, at C1, C3; Deborah Solomon, Tough
Tack of SEC Chief Could Relent, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2005, at C1, C5.
132
See generally Geraldine Szott Moohr, An Enron Lesson: The Modest Role of Criminal
Law in Preventing Corporate Crime, 55 FLA. L. REV. 937 (2003).
133
15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(g).
134
15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(g)(9).
130
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135

basis.” More importantly, the audit committee of the issuer’s board
of directors can also grant exceptions from the rules. A variety of
non-audit work is permissible with the committee’s approval—or
136
even the approval of a single delegated committee member.
Among the non-audit services an audit committee may approve are
tax services. The problem is that tax services and auditing are a bad
mix. The tax accountant is an advocate. In performing tax services,
an accounting firm’s specific task is to advance its client’s interests, as
the Supreme Court has recognized:
The filing of a corporate tax return entails much more than
filling in the blanks on an IRS form in accordance with
undisputed tax principles; more likely than not, the return is a
composite interpretation of corporate transactions made by
137
corporate officers in the light most favorable to the taxpayer.
138

The auditor, in contrast, plays an essentially judicial role. SarbanesOxley, however, allows a single accounting firm to wear both hats:
advancing the corporation’s interests on the tax side, while giving its
financial disclosure statements a disinterested review on the audit
side. It is not difficult to imagine that a firm in such a position would
tend to see itself more as a certifier of its client’s financial disclosure
than as a vigorous watchdog for the public.
The Act does require that, if the audit committee allows an
accounting firm doing the audit to also perform non-audit services,
this must be disclosed in the corporation’s regular periodic public
139
report.
In theory, disclosure should act as a check on abuse.
Auditors would exercise caution to do a good audit knowing that
their potential conflict of interest would be made public. Investors
who learned that a corporation conducted additional business with its
auditing firm would pay less per share due to the increased risk that
the auditor’s interest in continued business made the audit less

135

15 U.S.C. § 7231. The exceptions to the independence rules are allowed “to
the extent that such exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public interest and
is consistent with the protection of investors . . . .” Id.
136
15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(h) (exemption); 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(i)(B)(3) (delegation).
137
United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 815 (1984) (emphasis
added).
138
Recognizing the quasi-judicial role of the auditor, the Supreme Court noted
that an auditor’s review of a tax return could be helpful in an IRS investigation: “It is
difficult to say that the assessment by the independent auditor of the correctness of
positions taken by the taxpayer in his return would not throw ‘light upon’ the
correctness of the return.” Id.
139
15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(i)(2) (“Approval by an audit committee . . . of a non-audit
service to be performed by the auditor of the issuer shall be disclosed to investors in
periodic reports required by section 13(a).”).
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reliable. Because share prices would reflect the possibility of bias,
there would be no need to regulate further.
One study, however, suggests that disclosure would not lead to
investor caution. Disturbingly, disclosure might even make things
140
worse by cutting down on auditors’ self-monitoring.
In this
experiment, several jars were filled with coins. Study participants
were assigned to pairs. One member of the pair was given the
responsibility of estimating the amount of money in the jars, but
could only observe the jars from a distance. The other member of
the pair played the role of advisor and could study the jars up close.
The “advisor,” however, was not paid according to how accurate the
estimator guessed the number of coins, but rather according to how
high the estimator guessed. This gave the advisor every incentive to
report a misleadingly large coin count. This pay arrangement was
disclosed to the estimators in half of the pairs and kept secret from
the other half. In the half where there was full disclosure, the
estimators, nevertheless, fully considered the advice they were
receiving despite knowing that the advisors had a reason to mislead
them. Furthermore, the advisors felt freer to report even more
inaccurate estimates than they had before, presumably because they
141
assumed that the estimators would discount them.
If this study
predicts auditor and investor behavior, it calls into question the idea
that disclosure can cure the conflict that arises from simultaneously
performing auditing and non-auditing services.
4.

Supervision by the Audit Committee: A Return to
“Detective Auditing”?

Finally, Sarbanes-Oxley reaches inside the corporate structure of
the audited corporation to make the audit committee of the audited
corporation’s board of directors responsible for overseeing the audit.
The executives responsible for preparing the books can no longer be
the same people who select and supervise the auditors that review
and assess them. Now, the audit committee must preapprove
142
contracts for auditing and any non-audit services, resolve disputes
143
between auditors and management, and establish a confidential
anonymous procedure for employees to report questionable
144
accounting procedures.
The audit committee must consist of
140
141
142
143
144

Id.
Id.
15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(i)(1)(A).
15 U.S.C. § 78j-1.
See id.
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independent directors (not company executives) and possess the
145
authority and funding to hire its own lawyers and advisors. If audit
committee members do not supervise the audit properly, a
146
corporation could lose its ability to trade on a regulated exchange.
This, for our purposes, is Sarbanes-Oxley’s most far-reaching
reform of auditing, because it has the possibility of actually changing
the incentive structure. Earlier, I discussed two different auditor–
client relationships. In detective auditing, discussed in Part I.A.1, the
auditor works for the information user, namely, the owner of the
resources used in the business, who wants a candid assessment of the
actions of the managers. In certification auditing, discussed in Part
I.B.1, the auditor works for the corporation as a whole, which is
disclosing information to a third party information user. Securities
disclosure auditing shares the structure of certification auditing: the
auditor works for the corporation that discloses financial reports to
the third party information user, namely, the public. This sits
uncomfortably with the regulatory purpose, which is to give the
public good information. That purpose suggests that auditors should
work for the public, not the corporation.
Another way to look at securities financial disclosure, however, is
not as disclosure to the amorphous “public,” but as disclosure to the
owners of the corporation who are so numerous and dispersed that
147
public disclosure is the only practical way to reach them.
Seen in
this light, an auditing committee of independent directors is a logical
principal for the auditor. It represents the shareholders, who are the
owners of the corporation. Like any owner, the committee would
seek a report from the auditor on what its agents (i.e. management)
have been doing with its invested resources. Ideally, having the audit
committee in charge would recreate the medieval alignment of roles
among the detective auditor, the auditor’s employer (the lord of the
manor), and the subject of the audit. With the audit committee as
the representative of the shareholders, the business “owner” would be
the principal hiring the detective auditor. Its goal: a candid report
on the doings of management.
145

See 15 U.S.C. § 78f(m)(3) (independence); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78f(m)(5)
(authority to engage advisors), § 78f(m)(6) (funding).
146
See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(1)(A).
147
See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers: The Financial Statement
Insurance Alternative to Auditor Liability, 52 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 413, 414 (2004)
[hereinafter Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers] (“A partial solution to corporate
structure’s separation of ownership from control requires managers to report the
corporation’s condition and performance to investors, using a generally recognized
accounting system and a third-party auditor vouching for the report’s veracity.”).
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Is the audit committee up to the task? Faith in the audit
committee suggests Congress’ endorsement of the view that the job
of corporate boards of directors is to monitor the company’s
activities, rather than to focus on other traditional functions such as
148
management, advice, and obtaining resources for the company.
Independent directors represent the key to the monitoring board.
Because they are outside the corporation, the theory is that they can
ensure that it operates in the interest of the shareholders and the
public, and fulfills its legal responsibilities, including the duty to
promulgate accurate financial disclosure. Empirically, the success of
audit committees in improving auditing has been mixed. Studies
show that a company with an audit committee of independent
directors is less likely to buy potentially compromising non-audit
149
services from the audit firm.
Furthermore, it is more likely, when
troubled, to disclose a report noting that the company may not
continue as a going concern and less likely to dismiss the auditor who
150
gave the “going concern” qualification.
On the other hand, these
committees did not prevent recent abuses. Enron’s board had
fourteen independent directors and only two insiders. Its audit
committee had a state-of-the-art charter providing direct access to the
company’s staff and consultants plus the ability to hire its own
151
accountants and lawyers.
Nevertheless, it was not able to head off
deceptive disclosure.
For audit committees to ensure good auditing, they need both
sufficient strength and sufficient motivation. Both are difficult to
achieve. The audit committee, even if it meets every month (which is
not the rule) cannot participate in corporate affairs to the same
extent as executives who tend to the corporation’s business full time
and whose personal fortunes are at stake. Independent directors are
part-timers. Though they may have ultimate oversight of the audit,
management still has the day-to-day interactions with the auditors
and negotiates and proposes audit contracts for the committee’s
approval. It is an empirical question just how independent the
independent directors are able to be. One aspect of the recent
scandals was influence of independent directors by corporations
through consulting payments, transactions with directors’ businesses

148

Gregory S. Rowland, Earnings Management, the SEC and Corporate Governance:
Director Liability Arising from the Audit Committee Report, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 168, 179–86
(2002).
149
ARNOLD ET AL., supra note 12, at 19.
150
Id.
151
Gordon, supra note 63, at 1241.
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152

or contributions to favorite charities. Sarbanes-Oxley now prohibits
independent directors from receiving “any consulting, advisory, or
other compensatory fee” other than compensation for serving on the
153
board.
Another fear is that independent directors might identify too
strongly with managers to monitor them well. Until recently some
sixty-three percent of the directors of U.S. public companies were
154
chief executive officers of other corporations.
There exist some
indications that, in the wake of Sarbanes-Oxley’s heightened director
liability and responsibility, fewer CEOs currently serve on outside
boards. In 1997, CEOs of Standard & Poors 500 companies served on
an average of two outside boards; in 2005, the average decreased to
155
0.9 outside boards.
Even when audit committee members act in the best of faith to
promote shareholders’ interests, there is another potential stumbling
block: what are those interests? Shareholders have a variety of
interests. Some want the sort of long-term corporate credibility that
scrupulous adherence to law and good disclosure can promote;
others seek the short-term profit that might be helped by cooking the
156
books.
How the directors should weigh these interests is beyond
the scope of this Article. The point is only that, when it comes to
financial disclosure, it may not be obvious what directors’ fiduciary
duties require. If the accounting rules are not crystal clear, and an
underlying problem is one that a company prefers to keep hidden
this quarter with the hope of correcting next quarter, directors could
believe that shareholders are served by less than the most candid
disclosure.

152

Enron made significant use of all three of these channels. See S. REP. NO. 10770, at 55 (2002).
153
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78f(m)(3) (Supp. II 2002)
(“Each member of the audit committee of the issuer [i.e., the audited corporation]
shall be a member of the board of directors of the issuer, and shall otherwise be
independent. In order to be considered to be independent . . . a member of an
audit committee of an issuer may not, other than in his or her capacity as a member
of the audit committee, the board of directors or any other board committee accept
any consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee from the issuer; or be an
affiliated person of the issuer or any subsidiary thereof.”).
154
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Derivative Impact? Some Early Reflections on the Corporations Law
Implications of the Enron Debacle, 57 BUS. LAW. 1371, 1380 (2002).
155
Anita Raghavan, More CEOs Say ‘No Thanks’ to Board Seats, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28,
2005, at B1, B14.
156
See Joseph T. Walsh, The Fiduciary Foundation of Corporate Law, 27 J. CORP. L.
333, 334, 336–37 (2002).
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Conclusion: Structural Mis-Incentives Remain

Sarbanes-Oxley creates a number of incentives for actors in the
current information disclosure system to do a better job. PCAOB
oversight may give the Big Four accounting firms reason to perform
more scrupulous audits, even though the Big Four still retain a
monopoly over large-company auditing and do not compete with one
another on the axis of audit quality. Enhanced penalties for
managers whose corporations issue misleading disclosures may create
demand for careful accounting and auditing.
The new
independence rules, even with their exceptions, should at least
diminish auditors’ incentives to go easy on an audit in order to
preserve their firms’ other business ties with the companies being
audited. Further, the involvement of the audit committee will
insulate auditors from direct pressure by the management whose
accounting is being reviewed.
Of course, the improvements have potential costs. Enhanced
157
liability and responsibility may scare off good directors.
Compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley, as some have claimed, may prove
158
too costly for small companies.
The emphasis on independent
directors may harm corporations if these directors are too risk
159
averse, or harm the board’s ability to work in a collegial manner at
160
its main task of guiding the corporation. Too much independence
could be a problem for auditors as well if it prevents them from
gaining the informal working knowledge of the corporation that
improves their grasp of its financial records and their potential
trouble areas.
More significantly, Sarbanes-Oxley does not resolve the basic
schizophrenia in the regulatory structure: Auditors still work for the
audited corporations, but are supposed to protect the interests of the
public. Rules requiring accounting firms to rotate lead audit partners

157

Raghavan, supra note 155, at B14.
See, e.g., Solomon, supra note 131, at C1, C5.
159
Peter J. Wallison, Blame Sarbanes-Oxley, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 2003, at A16
(arguing that independent directors are too risk averse and that Sarbanes-Oxley’s
requirement that they have greater influence in corporate governance may be to
blame for the failure of the economy to rebound despite the aggressive tax cuts,
deficits, and low interest rates that usually stimulate business growth).
160
Troy A. Paredes, Enron: The Board, Corporate Governance and Some Thoughts on the
Role of Congress, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 495, 497–99,
520 (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dhara eds., 2004) (noting that monitoring boards
are not necessarily better for all corporations because of the possibility of harming
the board’s ability to manage, work in a collegial manner, and provide resources,
especially in the case of a start-up corporation).
158
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161

every five years and to take a year off after one of their auditors
162
becomes a major officer of the audited corporation may make it
harder for the individual auditor to protect his or her friends at the
client corporation, but this is far from the only problem. An
engagement to audit a large public corporation is still a valuable asset
to an accounting firm. Though Sarbanes-Oxley takes a step towards
giving auditors the means and the motive to be public watchdogs, the
client–auditor relationship remains one in which the auditor is
“certifying” the client’s financial information. That alone can give
auditors a reason to see things from the corporation’s point of view.
III. ALIGNING AUDITORS’ INCENTIVES WITH THE PUBLIC INTEREST:
ELEMENTS OF REFORM
As we have seen, from the audited corporation’s viewpoint,
auditors can act as detectives, providing an honest assessment of a
financial statement to a client. Or, they can act as certifiers,
approving the client’s financial statements before they are disclosed
to a third party. Either role on its own makes sense. If the client
wants candor, the detective auditor can provide it. If the client wants
documents reviewed and certified for a third party, the certification
auditor can do that. The problem with U.S. financial disclosure law is
that while it assumes the auditor will serve as a detective on behalf of
the public, it puts the auditor in a certification relationship with the
client.
It might be objected at this point that this problem is hardly
unique to auditors. Many professionals must evaluate the actions of
their paying clients against an outside, and sometimes unflattering,
standard. Lawyers, for instance, often tell clients they cannot lawfully
do what they want to do. An appraiser hired to give a valuation is
expected to use professional judgment, though the result might
disappoint the property owner. Teachers must grade students,
inevitably displeasing the half of the class that cannot be above
average. The common thread is that the professional is supposed to
make an evaluation that furthers a social goal and potentially furthers
the client’s long-term interests, but that may run contrary to the
client’s current desires or short-term interests. For instance, an
aggressive tax shelter violates the long-term social interest in
equitable taxation according to law and may harm a client long-term
if it faces a tax audit. On the other hand, it may be a great immediate
161

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 203, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(j) (Supp. II 2002).
The officers are chief executive, chief financial officer or chief accounting
officer or equivalent. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(l).
162
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financial benefit to the client. An undeservedly high grade may
please a student today, but not advance the student’s long-term goal
of getting a good education. The auditing analogue is apparent:
Approving misleading financial disclosure may temporarily keep
share price high, a short-term benefit. However, the duplicity harms
the social interest in transparency for investors and puts the company
163
at risk of collapse in the long term when the truth finally comes out.
These observations suggest that auditing is not unique in kind.
Professionals often must decide how to respond when a client’s
immediate interests conflict with its long-term interests and with the
dictates of the law, a larger question beyond the scope of this Article.
Securities disclosure auditors nevertheless face the problem to a
greater degree than others. Many other professionals rely on a
system of “adversarial” testing to supplement their work. Their job is
to advance the client’s position, drawing all legitimate inferences in
favor of the client, understanding that their conclusions are subject
to attack by an opponent. Lawyers, whether in litigation or
transactions, usually face someone on the other side. So do other
“evaluative professionals.” For example, appraisal reports may be
tested in court (e.g., in a tax assessment or eminent domain
proceeding) or presented to a third party (e.g., a bank loan
department) that can challenge and evaluate them. These situations
are like auditing for certification.
In contrast, public company financial disclosure cannot easily be
tested by investors, nor is the SEC able to scrutinize every filing.
Furthermore, what adversarial checks on financial disclosure do exist
have limited time to take effect. The market responds to financial
disclosure within minutes. Even when a regulator or analyst evaluates
financial information, the evaluation may come too late to protect
many investors from loss. This puts great pressure on the auditor to
ensure that the disclosure is of good quality in the first place.
It may be morally legitimate for society to demand that auditors
be public watchdogs even at the risk of financial loss to themselves
(e.g., when a client withdraws lucrative business). That does not
mean it is wise policy to depend on professional altruism to
guarantee the quality of corporate financial disclosure. A better
approach would provide auditors with incentives to do the sort of job
the public needs done. At the very least, they should not have
incentives to do the opposite. In my view, mis-incentives will pose a
threat as long as the auditor’s clients lack the incentive to demand and
163

For example, Enron’s $586 million restatement of four years’ of net income
lead to its collapse. For further discussion see supra Part II.C.
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pay for good auditing. Thus, if certification auditing is to remain the
model, then the law should give clients the motive to seek out
auditors of known integrity. Or, if the auditor is to be a detective, he
or she must work for someone who wants a candid report and will
share it with the public. Do alternative regulatory schemes exist that
will better align the auditor’s and client’s incentives with the public
interest?
A. Why Do Some Systems of Regulation by Information Disclosure
Thrive?
In assessing the wisdom of changes in any regulatory system, the
question is, will they help make the system as a whole better able to
achieve the regulatory goal? This system approach is, I believe,
especially important in considering regulation of securities disclosure
auditing, which can be easy to see as an isolated, narrow topic.
SEC financial disclosure is best analyzed as one of many
regulatory regimes that seek to modify behavior not by primary
directives and prohibitions but by giving actors information to use
themselves. These systems are incentive based. They do not require
the desired activity to take place. Rather, they require some actors to
disclose information in order to induce others to do what is the goal
of the exercise. For instance, the regulatory goal of nutrition labeling
is not that every chocolate-chip muffin bear a terrifying calorie count
on its label or that every display of oranges tout their high Vitamin C
content. The goal is healthier Americans. The means to the goal is
information disclosure based on the assumption that people will
respond rationally to the information by choosing more nutritious
foods. To take another example, many states seeking to increase
hospital safety require hospitals to report medical mistakes, such as
“foreign objects left in a patient” or “operation on the wrong body
164
part,” to a state agency. Thus, these states seek to achieve their goal
of making hospitals safer by forcing hospitals to identify and confront
their errors and provide information to regulators. Minnesota
recently began naming individual hospitals and disclosing errors to
165
the public as well. This harnesses a private incentive as a means to
the regulatory goal. Hospitals will have an additional reason to avoid
errors—they might lose patients.

164

Paul Davies, Minnesota Issues a Hospital Report Card: Tallying of Medical Errors Is
Intended to Arm Patients and Spur Better Prevention, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 2005, at D5.
165
Id.; see also Minnesota Department of Health, http://www.health.state.mn.us/
patientsafety/index.html (last updated Jan. 19, 2005).
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Securities regulation is an information disclosure system with the
goal of promoting wise investment. The means to effectuating that
goal is disclosure of financial information about companies because
there is an assumption that, in the aggregate, investors will
productively allocate capital if they can correctly assess the risks and
benefits of the underlying activity. The job of the auditor is to see
that the disclosed information is as faithful a reflection of the
underlying economic activity as possible. Scholars often focus on the
information itself, noting, for instance, that it must be useable,
relevant, and available to its intended beneficiaries when they are
166
making decisions.
This alone is too narrow. Empirical research
shows that a good regulatory system must also take account of the
needs and motives of both the information user and the information
discloser.
A Harvard study examined SEC financial disclosure and several
other disclosure systems: nutrition labeling, reporting of medical
mistakes, toxic release disclosure, publication of patterns of mortgage
lending, and disclosure of unions’ financial information. The goal of
the study was to see why some disclosure regimes succeeded while
167
others degenerated into useless paper exercises.
Because
regulation by information disclosure depends on incentives, the study
found that successful schemes had three characteristics: strong
demand for the information by information users, a benefit to
information disclosures from good disclosure, and standards that
allow information to be understood and compared.
168
First, strong intermediaries represent the information users.
This corrects an asymmetry of power that might otherwise lead the
disclosure system to deteriorate.
The costs of disclosure are
concentrated on the entity providing the information (in our case,
public corporations), while the benefits are diffused among many
information users (investors). Because disclosers tend to be better
organized than users, they can lobby more effectively for favorable
rules and enforcement policies. In successful disclosure schemes,
users have countervailing force. They also have organizations
working on their behalf. For example, environmental groups use
data regarding toxic spills, and therefore monitor such data. Other
community groups monitor bank lending practices.
166

STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 161–64 (1982).
Archon Fung et al., The Political Economy of Transparency: What Makes Disclosure
Policies Sustainable?, (Harvard Univ., John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t Faculty Research
Working Paper Series, RWP03-039, 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=384922.
168
Id. at 38–39.
167
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In the securities markets, a variety of intermediaries such as
institutional investors, stock analysts, and stock exchanges are in a
position to represent investors. A troubling aspect of the recent
scandals was that they did not vindicate investors’ interest in good
financial information. It was not uncommon for stock analysts, for
example, to over-recommend shares underwritten by their
169
employers’ investment banking divisions. A good regulatory system
must ensure that any entities that represent investors have their own
reasons to want financial disclosure to be of high quality. Auditors
could serve as these strong intermediaries if they had the incentives
of “detective” auditors.
170
Second, information is usable and comprehensible.
This
means that the “core metrics” must be (1) relatively simple, (2)
relatively comparable, and (3) agreed to by the interested parties.
Nutrition labeling, with its uniform method of presenting fat,
protein, calories, etc., fits this bill. GAAP satisfies the third of these
criteria: all accountants and publicly held corporations use it and
sophisticated investors are conversant with it. It is far from simple,
however, and the extent to which it produces data that are
comparable among companies is open to debate. Worse, because
GAAP permits the same economic activity to be reported in different
ways, financial statements can appear comparable without actually
presenting comparable information. Auditing reform needs to
change this.
Third, some information disclosers benefit from the information
171
disclosure. This is what keeps the system from stagnating. If some
entities gain an advantage from transparency and good disclosure,
they will comply with the disclosure requirements or even exceed
them. This will then create pressure for their competitors to follow
suit in a way that the threat of regulatory enforcement cannot. For
instance, when manufacturers were forced to report releases of
toxins, some voluntarily curtailed their releases, thereby satisfying the
regulatory goal.
They then benefited from the disclosure
requirement because it allowed them to brag about their clean
records, imposing a reputational cost on those who did not stop
172
spilling and had to continue to disclose spills.
In the securities context, the recent stock market scandals clearly
imposed high reputational costs on companies like Enron and
169
170
171
172

Coffee, It’s About the Gatekeepers, supra note 17, at 1412–13.
Fung et al., supra note 167, at 39.
Id. at 39–40.
Id.
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WorldCom on account of their faulty financial disclosure.
Conversely, there should be a way for good financial disclosure to
help companies stand out in a good way. If this were the case,
certification auditing—in which auditors have an incentive to do what
their clients want—could be good for the public. Clients would want
auditors to ensure that their financial disclosure was first rate. The
regulatory challenge here is to create incentives for corporations to
compete by offering better financial disclosure.
The following subsections discusses a variety of concrete reform
proposals in terms of these three criteria. The first two suggestions
would turn auditors into strong intermediaries for investors—better
detectives. In the first proposal, auditors would work for the
government, not the audited corporation. In the second proposal,
they would be more independent and therefore better able to act as
public watchdogs.
The next two suggestions concentrate on
improving the GAAP rules that currently can obscure rather than
clarify information. The third proposal is “enforced self-regulation,”
in which corporations tell their financial stories in an individualized
way. The fourth is its opposite, a plan in which essentially raw
financial data is disclosed. The fifth proposal focuses on making
good financial disclosure a competitive benefit to firms, so that they
would insist on good auditing. The sixth and final proposal is that
companies buy Financial Statement Insurance and disclose the
premium amount. This achieves all three goals. Auditors would be
strong intermediaries for the public because they would work for
insurance companies that would demand good auditing. Financial
information would improve. And, companies seeking to control
insurance premiums would benefit from good disclosure. Of all
these suggestions, Financial Statement Insurance deserves the most
serious consideration.
B. Strategies for Reform
1.

Better Detective Auditing: The Federal Bureau of
Audits

An obvious question: If public company auditors are supposed to
be public watchdogs, why aren’t they working for the government?
Public auditors could solve many problems. Corporations would not
hire their own auditors, so auditors would no longer be certifiers, just
detectives. A bureau of government auditors could apply auditing
standards more consistently, mitigating problems caused by
ambiguous rules. There are also good theoretical reasons for
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government to be involved. Corporations face a prisoner’s dilemma
when it comes to financial disclosure: If all disclose accurate
information (even if unfavorable), all benefit in the long run because
investors will have confidence in the market and will buy U.S. equities
in preference to other investments (e.g., real estate, bonds, foreign
securities). However, any one corporation can gain a short-term
advantage by distorting its figures since investors will assume they are
true. If a significant number of corporations (even a low number
may be significant) do this, all will be worse off because investors will
distrust disclosures and take money out of U.S. equity markets,
thereby making capital more expensive for all.
Investors, too, face a dilemma. If self-interested investors could
wave a magic wand, the first choice of those who already own a
corporation’s shares is for the corporation to disclose inaccurately
rosy information so they can sell their shares at a high price. The first
choice of the potential buyers would be the opposite: disclosure of
overly grim information, so they can buy shares cheaply. Because, by
hypothesis, the information is deceptive, and it is impossible to
release different information to sellers and buyers in any event, these
first choices are unavailable. The second choice of all investors is that
someone ensures that all information is accurate.
Solving
coordination problems such as these is a classic government function.
Another reason for government involvement is to further the
public interest. Even though capitalist societies leave investment
decisions in private hands, the allocation of productive economic
resources to entities that can best use them is a matter of extreme
importance literally to everyone, including future generations and
those too poor to ever participate in the market directly. This is
another reason that the government has a duty to see that investors
get high-quality information to use in making decisions.
Government auditing was considered and rejected in setting up
the securities regulation regime. Columbia law professor Adolf Berle,
a leading member of President Roosevelt’s “brain trust,”
unsuccessfully argued for establishment of a federal agency that
173
would “exact full information about securities sold.”
Dennis
Kucinich, Democratic Congressman from Ohio and candidate for his
party’s 2004 presidential nomination, introduced legislation in spring
2002, “to establish a Federal Bureau of Audits within the Securities
and Exchange Commission to conduct audits of all publicly

173

JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 41 (1982).
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174

registered companies.”
The proposed bureau would have audited
each public company once a year.
The House of Representatives voted down the Federal Bureau of
175
Audits, 39 in favor to 381 opposed. Floor debates raised a number
of problems. One had to do with the auditor’s incentives. Instead of
seeking to please an owner, as in detective auditing, or the audited
corporation, as in certification auditing, auditors would now have the
same incentives as any civil servants. Thus, Representative Nancy
Kelly predicted that government auditors would “combine the same
level of efficiency to accounting that HUD brought to housing . . . the
effectiveness of the IRS in its customer service . . . [and] the
accounting expertise of the Department of Defense with $100
176
hammers.”
Representative Michael Oxley, House sponsor of the SarbanesOxley Act, worried that government auditing could cause too much
government involvement in corporate business decision making:
“This is a big government solution. . . . I guess his message is, if you
have lost faith in the free market, you need to have faith in big
177
government. I do not think people are ready to make that leap.”
174

H.R. 3795, 107th Cong. (2002); see also H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. (2002)
(proposing substantially similar legislation as an amendment to a Sarbanes-Oxley
predecessor bill). For a scholarly discussion of the possibility of placing the
government in charge of auditing, see Mark A. Gullotta, The SEC’s Auditor
Independence Rule: Missing the Boat on Independence, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 221, 242–
44 (2001).
175
Final
Vote
Results
for
H.R.
3763,
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/
2002/roll107.xml.
176
148 CONG. REC. H1572 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 2002) (statement of Rep. Kelly)
(“[T]he amendment creates the Federal bureau of audits. I guess it is modeled after
the FBI so I can see auditors storming into companies with their calculators drawn,
demanding individuals to freeze and drop their pencils. The amendment seems to
envision that the most efficient and effective auditor would be the U.S. Government.
Somehow I just cannot agree with that, and I think this amendment is important for
us to take a good look at for its unintended consequences. I think the author is
looking to combine the same level of efficiency to accounting that HUD brought to
housing, perhaps. I imagine that the author is looking for the effectiveness of the
IRS in its customer service. Finally, with the accounting expertise of the Department
of Defense with $100 hammers, I am sure our corporations will be in the best hands
possible.”)
177
See, for example, the floor remarks of Congressman Michael Oxley:
This is a big government solution. It is a one-size-fits-all solution. It is
essentially the neutron bomb. I guess his message is, if you have lost
faith in the free market, you need to have faith in big government. I
do not think people are ready to make that leap. I think they
understand intuitively, based on their investments, that they trust the
free market, and they trust that our markets are the most open and
efficient markets in the world, represented by the American
marketplace.
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One potential problem is possible corruption or misuse of the bureau
for political purposes. A more certain problem is that particular
auditing standards can favor particular accounting standards, which
in turn favor some underlying business decisions over others. If the
government sets auditing standards, its influence will trickle down to
basic decisions. It is one thing for government tax rules to induce
particular underlying business decisions, since tax provisions often
have just that goal (e.g., the home mortgage interest deduction
encourages home ownership; Individual Retirement Accounts
encourage savings). In contrast, it would be perverse for government
auditing rules to induce particular business decisions, since the
purpose of auditing is to help provide transparency of information
about business activity—not to change the activity.
Another question is: Which government would employ
government auditors? Since basic corporate law is state law, logically,
each state would audit companies incorporated there. State audit
bureaus, however, would surely differ in funding, expertise, and
interpretations of accounting rules, destroying the comparability that
federal regulation offers. Just as state securities regulation (Blue Sky
laws) has proven too variable and has been overshadowed by federal
178
securities law, so too government auditing would almost surely have
to be federal, but the specter of federal corporate law has always met
resistance. This backdoor imposition of uniformity would be no
exception.
Finally, if concerns about preserving private enterprise and
federalism did not kill government auditing, it would probably run
aground on funding. Now, with corporations buying their own
auditing services, the cost of auditing is veiled—companies can pass it
along, if necessary, in the form of slightly higher prices. Public
provision of auditing services would make the cost obvious and bring
it into the political arena where funding for economic regulatory
agencies (such as the SEC and the Federal Trade Commission) has
proven vulnerable. Funding probably would be unreliable, or at the
very least, perceived as such. This would threaten, rather than
bolster, investor confidence. Funding could be more dependable if
the government charged companies an annual fee for their audits.
This, however, raises the possibility of inefficiency and expense

148 CONG. REC. H1573 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 2002) (statement of Rep. Oxley).
178
Prohs, supra note 6, at 482–84.
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because the entity paying the bill (the issuer) will not be able to
179
control the service bought with its money from the government.
180
As seen from the relative obscurity of the Kucinich proposal,
not even outrage at Enron and Arthur Andersen led to serious
consideration of a Federal Bureau of Audits.
Short of an
inconceivably worse scandal, it seems that U.S. securities disclosure
auditing will remain in the private sector.
2.

Better Certification Auditing

We now return to the current structure, in which corporations
hire their own auditors. Sarbanes-Oxley left this structure in place
and made reforms to improve it. As discussed in Part II.D, these
reforms did not remove auditors’ incentives to favor the client’s
interest over the public interest. Are there further reforms that
might do that?
a.

A Competitive, Independent Auditing Profession

One possibility is a self-conscious return to old-style certification
auditing. This produces good auditing because of the auditor’s
incentive to protect his or her reputation for quality work. If truly
reliable certification were available and investors came to seek out
this certification, then issuers would have an incentive to use good
auditors, creating a race to the top for auditing quality. This can
occur only if high-quality certification auditing is available to
corporations that want to buy it. Research disturbingly suggests that
it is not.
An extensive study of the financial disclosure of one thousand
large public firms from 1997 to 2001 found no evidence of
competition among the Big Four to offer and market high-quality
auditing to their clients. As noted earlier, the Big Four audit all
companies with annual sales above $5 billion and ninety-seven
181
percent of those with sales of $250 million or more.
Researchers
used the rates at which audited companies had to restate their
disclosed financial statements as a surrogate for auditing
179

Peter K.M. Chan, Breaking the Market’s Dependence on Independence: An Alternative
to the “Independent” Outside Auditor, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 347, 369 n.117
(2004).
180
Even the Sarbanes-Oxley position paper of the progressive Consumer
Federation of America proposed a corps of government auditors only briefly, then
backed off to suggest that stock exchanges hire and fire auditors. CONSUMER FED’N
OF AM., INVESTOR PROTECTION LESSONS FROM THE ENRON COLLAPSE AND AN AGENDA FOR
REFORM 6–7 (2002).
181
See GAO STUDY, supra note 54.
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inaccuracies. The theory is that inaccurate financial statements are
182
difficult to cover up forever and eventually need to be corrected.
They found different rates of restatement among different years,
different industries, and different regions of the country. But they
found no significant difference at all among public companies
according to which major firm the company employed to audit its
183
financial statements.
The study concluded: “[M]anagers of large
public companies who want to distinguish themselves from their
competitors by choosing a tough, high quality auditor cannot do so.
As measured by financial restatement rates, no such auditor is
available: one cannot reject the hypothesis that they all are the
184
same.”
In short, sellers (accounting firms that do audits) form an
oligopoly that offers buyers (the corporations disclosing financial
information) little choice when it comes to quality.
The securities laws could help create a market for quality
auditing by tightening the independence rules in two ways. The first
step would be to require complete independence between auditor
and client. Sarbanes-Oxley still allows accounting firms to offer some
services contemporaneously with the audit, notably tax advice. As
long as accounting firms are doing any additional business with
clients, an incentive remains to ease up on the audit to protect the
relationship. The second step would be to limit the period during
which an accounting firm can audit a corporation, perhaps to a fixed
five-to seven-year audit period, followed by the same amount of time
off.
Taken together, these rules would significantly change the
incentives of accounting firms. Currently, a contract to perform both
auditing and permitted non-audit services for a large corporation is a
valuable asset to an accounting firm. It can conceivably last forever.
The partners in charge have a motive to protect this valuable client
relationship. If full auditor independence were mandated, this asset
would cease to exist because firms could no longer do auditing and
other services on an open-ended basis. Accounting firms would need
to choose. They could not do both. Because non-audit services may
be more lucrative and would not be time-limited, the Big Four would
probably try to keep the non-auditing work, and thus, send their
clients to find another auditor. Big corporations will still need audits,
182

See Eisenberg & Macey, supra note 18, at 272–89.
Id. at 264.
184
Id. at 299; see also Coffee, It’s About the Gatekeepers, supra note 17, at 1414–15
(discussing the possibility that in auditing, the large firms appear to have used the
parallel strategy of going along with clients on contested auditing matters in order to
keep their non-auditing business).
183
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so we may expect the emergence of new, specialized audit firms; call
them the “Little Four.”
There would be two benefits from this realignment of the
profession. At the Little Four and other firms concentrating on
auditing, auditors would not just be handling a relatively unprofitable
side-business. They would be leaders able to set the professional
tone. At least some firms could be expected to emphasize the old
ethos of independence and integrity. In such an atmosphere, senior
auditors could maintain their ethics, junior auditors could develop an
ethics-first outlook, and firms could compete for clients based on
reputation and audit quality.
Additionally, under current law, the Big Four can still “bundle”
the audit with allowed and approved non-auditing services and offer
the whole package at an attractive price by doing the audit at low
cost. This makes it hard for smaller firms to compete. A client
corporation is likely to keep all of its auditing and accounting
business with one firm if it receives a lower cost audit as part of the
package. If accounting firms could not offer auditing at loss-leader
prices, however, corporations would have no reason not to diversify
the rest of their non-audit service purchases as long as they had to
find a new auditor anyway. They could bid out work to many
different accounting firms, creating more opportunity for the Little
185
Four and others.
This discussion suggests that complete segregation of audit and
non-audit services could help create competition in the market for
quality auditing. But if such choice became available, would
corporations seek it out? One issue is whether corporations will be
willing to pay the extra cost of quality. This will depend on whether
186
they think it will produce a competitive advantage.
A knottier issue is whether the quality of audited financial
statements can be transparent enough for the market to operate, so
that issuers could truly compete in the area of quality of financial
187
disclosure. This is the well-known “lemons” problem. In order for
buyers to reward high quality, they have to be able to identify it. In a
lemons market, however, buyers lack the information to distinguish
among high-, medium-, and low-quality products or services. When
sellers cannot reliably signal high quality to buyers, it is rational for
buyers to assume that all products or services are of equally lower
185

See Coffee, It’s About the Gatekeepers, supra note 17, at 1414–15.
For further discussion, see infra Part III.B.2.c.
187
George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 499–500 (1970).
186
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quality. The standard example is an unregulated used car market,
where there is no way to know which cars are lemons and which are
not. This uncertainty depresses the price of good cars as well as bad.
b.

Reforms in Information Standards

The lemons problem may arise in auditing because GAAP rules
may not allow sufficient quality discrimination. They are so flexible
that an auditor can attest that a report accords with GAAP, yet the
report will not actually “present fairly in all material respects” the
188
corporation’s true financial condition.
For this reason, many
commentators see a better GAAP as the key to better auditing.
Others, however, do not think there is such a thing as a better GAAP.
On this view, the books of large corporations are so complex that
under any set of rules, it will always be possible to achieve technical
compliance and still give a misleading picture. If this is true, then
better standards will not help. Radical change would be needed. I
will next consider radical change at two ends of the spectrum.
i.

A British Solution: Enforced Self-Regulation

One view of the problem with GAAP is that it is too detailed. Far
from giving welcome guidance and certainty, on this view, the large
number of detailed, specific directives is just what makes it possible to
follow the letter of the rules while violating their spirit.
The British approach to this issue is instructive. British
accounting standards (U.K. GAAP) are far less detailed than their
American counterpart (U.S. GAAP). They enunciate principles more
than rules, giving auditors and accountants more flexibility than their
189
U.S. counterparts in complying with GAAP.
Proponents of the
British system argue that the lack of detailed rules to “hide behind”
forces the accountant and auditor to actually live up to the principle
190
of disclosure of the company’s true economic situation.
The
weakness of a principles-based system, however, is that it may give too
little guidance. In the words of the British scholars Ayres and
Braithwaite, the requirement of “true and fair accounts” (U.K.
GAAP) is a “bland admonishment” whose “very amorphousness
191
The cure, in their view, is “enforced selfhinders prosecution.”
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ARNOLD ET AL., supra note 12, at 269–74.
190
Id.
191
IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING
DEREGULATION DEBATE 109 (1992).
189

THE

2005

AUDITING REGULATION

1079

regulation,” and they see corporate accounting as an ideal candidate
192
for this approach.
In enforced self-regulation, each regulated entity devises its own
plan for meeting the regulatory objective, sometimes in consultation
with stakeholders. For example, a public corporation’s stakeholders
would include employees and community members along with
investors, managers, and directors. Once in place, the plan is the
“law” for the entity, and violations can be penalized. Tailored selfregulatory standards are easily enforced because they contain clear
guidelines that the corporation has already agreed are applicable and
feasible. “Creative compliance” is unlikely because the company
selects and discloses its own set of rules to vindicate the regulatory
principles.
Thus, following these rules achieves, rather than
193
frustrates, the principle of financial transparency. Companies have
an incentive to follow their plans because it is easy to tell if they are
not following them. And, they have an incentive to commit
themselves to a high level of quality in the plan because the plans are
disclosed to the public.
Any advantages of enforced self-regulation, however, are
overwhelmed by the problem of comparability. The hallmark of
enforced self-regulation is that there is no single standard, but rather
many roads to the regulatory goal. Each company is different. In
financial disclosure, however, the regulatory goal requires that
disclosed information enable investors to compare corporations.
Comparison requires a common measure. If enforced self-regulation
were used, investors would need to analyze and digest company plans
and then translate the information into some comparable form.
Investors or their intermediaries would simply end up reinventing
general standards, with the difference that there would be no
regulatory enforcement to back them up.
ii.

Raw Information Disclosure

An opposite approach to allowing self-tailored analysis of
corporate financial information is to forego the analysis altogether.
This reform is based on the observation that at its root, the problem
of creative compliance with the GAAP rules is that accountants and
auditors analyze information in a way that turns out to be misleading.
Self-regulation tries to improve the analysis by making it more
individualized, so that companies cannot get around the rules.
Alternatively, instead of telling companies to disclose audited
192
193

Id. at 106–09.
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financial reports, Congress could require them to disclosure raw
disaggregated data, such as daily revenue, materials expenditure,
lease payments, etc. Investors and their intermediaries, armed with
computer capacity, would do their own interpreting.
Some
companies might still offer analyzed information, as they do now,
knowing that others would be reviewing it and comparing it with the
194
underlying data.
Other companies may skip the expense of their
own analysis and let the numbers speak for themselves.
Supporters of simplified disclosure rightly link it to continuous
195
disclosure, as has Congress.
Through Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress
authorized the SEC to require corporations to disclose material
changes in operations or financial condition “on a rapid and current
196
basis” and “in plain English.” This makes sense. Stocks now trade
virtually instantaneously and financial news is reported around the
clock. It is somewhat anachronistic for the SEC’s disclosure regime
to follow the schedule, developed in the 1930s, of annual and
quarterly reports with fifteen-day supplemental filings for a few
197
material events.
The posting of these filings on the internet
198
through the SEC’s EDGAR system and the accelerated deadlines for
199
some large corporations to file their quarterly and annual reports
does not change the fact that the information is still compiled only at
these relatively long intervals. Even the best information represents
only a snapshot, not a moving picture.
The persistence of quarterly reports in a world of near-constant
financial news reporting is not just quaint but dangerous. For
instance, it enables corporations to engage in “earnings
200
management,” the practice of manipulating accounting to show
quarterly earnings that meet publicized projections, even if that
means reporting income and expenses in the wrong quarter.
Corporations also may release overoptimistic pro forma earnings to the
press, enjoy the resulting rise in share prices, and then correct the
201
information with little fanfare in official filings weeks later.
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Sarbanes-Oxley tries to discourage this by requiring executives to
disgorge bonuses and profits they earn through manipulating share
202
prices.
With continuous information disclosure, these deceptive
practices would be impossible because they depend on the lag time
between the unofficial projections, which can be made with few legal
consequences, and the official regulatory filings.
Though this reform proposal is directed at the nature of the
information disclosed, we are interested in it here because of its
effect on the structure of the relationship between auditor and client,
and therefore, on the auditor’s incentives. If companies disclose raw
financial information, the job now done by auditors would be split in
two. Corporations would hire other auditors to design and monitor
their information disclosure systems. Then, investors or other
entities would hire auditors to review and analyze the disclosed raw
information.
The auditors engaged by the corporation would concentrate on
issues such as designing and monitoring information systems and
internal controls. They would not be reviewing the client’s analysis of
the financial information, with its many accounting judgment calls
and numbers that rest on future projections (e.g., the value of leases,
intellectual property, options, etc.). There would be no such analysis
and no such predictions. Continuous disclosure gives companies
reason to work with these auditors to design the best informationdisclosure systems they can. First, with disclosure made on a
continuous basis, corporations will face additional exposure to
liability for material misstatements or omissions and presumably will
203
turn to their auditors to help minimize it.
Second, good
information disclosure should create a competitive advantage for the
company that makes it. When investors bear the cost of information
analysis, they will presumably reward corporations that disclose
reliable information in an easy-to-use form. Thus, the auditors
engaged by the corporation would find it easier to do their job in a
way that protects the public interest. Their clients would have reason
to demand better disclosure, and their jobs would involve less
exercise of judgment and the attendant opportunity to shade
judgments in a client’s favor.
The other half of the current auditor’s job is reviewing the
client’s analysis of financial information according to GAAP. The
corporation’s auditor would not conduct this review because the
information released by the client would not be analyzed. However,
202
203

15 U.S.C. § 7243.
Prohs, supra note 6, at 495.
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someone will still need to digest the raw numbers in order to make
them useful as a basis for investment decisions. This will create a
second body of “analysis auditors” to serve investors. At first blush,
this seems to promise a good alignment of incentives; as in detective
auditing, the auditor will be working for the information user.
The problem, however, is that investors come in a variety of
shapes and sizes. Institutional investors will be able to hire highquality auditors who will report to them directly and have incentives
204
to read the numbers skeptically and carefully.
These auditors
should be able to do a good job. They will be dealing with fresh
information that they can more easily evaluate and analyze in
205
whatever way best serves the client-investor’s information needs.
Other investors, however, will not be able to have full-time
auditors on their payrolls. Instead, they will need to obtain financial
analysis elsewhere. Presumably, a body of “consulting auditors” will
market their independent services. Their incentive to do a good
audit of the raw data will depend on how valuable quality is in
marketing their services. There is a potential lemons problem here.
If auditing quality is not transparent to consumers (and it may well
not be), then these consultants could end up competing along other
lines. The role of these independent consulting auditors is analogous
to the role played by securities analysts now. Their many failures to
206
give impartial advice suggest that while this proposal can result in
good in-house “private watchdogs” for some institutional investors, it
will not necessarily ensure that “public watchdog” auditing is available
generally. And, viewed at a macro level, the sheer number of
“investor-audits” will surely entail duplication of efforts and a waste of
207
resources.
These considerations suggest that investors are not
necessarily a better principal for the auditor than the government.
We therefore return to considering whether the current structure, in
which auditors work for audited corporations, can be preserved but
reformed.

204
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The Elusive Market for Good Disclosure

I will assume for purposes of this discussion that corporations
will seek out and buy better auditing only if it gives them a
208
competitive advantage with their own customers and investors.
Such competition is not obvious right now; there are no corporate
full-page Wall Street Journal ads promising “We Will Not Try to Fool
the Auditors,” nor does “Fair Financial Disclosure” appear on
consumer product labels along with “Cruelty-free” (cosmetics) and
“Fair Trade” (coffee and cocoa). Competition on the axis of
financial disclosure quality would require auditors to compete for
customers, that is, investors who care about it and will use it as a
reason to invest. Who are these investor-customers?
Some investors might buy shares in a company just because it
offers better financial disclosure. Ethical investment funds are an
obvious possibility. However, these funds generally seek a variety of
characteristics in companies they own, such as good labor and
environmental practices. It might be difficult for issuers to gain a
significant advantage just by offering fair financial disclosure.
Additionally, these funds do not represent a huge segment of the
market.
The other possible customers of financial disclosure quality are
investors who care about an issuer’s long-term success. In the short
run, good auditing may well hurt share prices by disclosing
information about a company’s failure and limitations. However, it is
a benefit in the long run. Misleading disclosure rarely does more
than buy time, and there are substantial reputational and economic
209
costs when the truth finally emerges. The problem is that investors
generally seek financial gain based on the long-term prospect of an
entire portfolio of diversified investments, not just a particular
company. For any particular company, good financial disclosure
would be just one of many indicia of future success. It could not
make up for a bad product, for instance. Nevertheless, good
financial disclosure could well become one among many reasons for
long-term investors to pick X Company’s shares over Y Company’s,
and that could provide the needed competitive advantage.
Note however, that this competition can only take place if the
reforms discussed above have already been made and (a) auditors
compete for business on the basis of quality and (b) GAAP is
208

After shares are initially offered to the public, of course, a corporation gains no
capital directly from sales of shares. This discussion assumes, however, that high
share prices are generally a benefit to public corporations.
209
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reformed so that higher (and lower) quality financial disclosure
auditing is more obvious to the market. Neither is the case now.
The SEC has tried to create investor demand for quality via
regulation of mutual funds. Mutual funds invest the savings of some
210
ninety-three million people and have a long-term outlook. It
seemed as if they might have had an incentive to become involved in
the governance of the corporations they invest in, in order to make
those corporations improve their financial disclosure. In 2002, the
Department of Labor issued an interpretation of federal pension law
stating that one of the fiduciary duties of fund managers is to vote
proxies on shares that the plan holds where the vote concerns an
211
issue “that may affect the value of the plan’s investment.” In order
to encourage funds to participate in corporate affairs, the SEC
212
followed with a rule that funds must publicize their proxy votes: “As
major shareholders, mutual funds may play a vital role in monitoring
213
the stewardship of the companies in which they invest.”
Mutual funds, so far, do not seem to want to be surrogate
regulators of corporate behavior. The largest U.S. mutual funds
strongly (but unsuccessfully) opposed the SEC voting disclosure rule.
They feared it would invite lobbying from special interest groups,
thereby distracting the funds from getting their investors the best
214
return on their savings. This opposition is not surprising. Mutual
funds historically have avoided involvement in corporate affairs
except in rare instances, for example, if a fund ends up holding so
many shares in a particular corporation that selling them all at once
215
would depress the price.
A fund might have to get involved in
corporate governance if an investment policy requires it to hold
shares in set proportions (such as an index fund). In such a
situation, it could not sell poor performers and should therefore try

210
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216

to improve them internally. Otherwise, most funds have pursued a
strategy of exit, not voice, following the “Wall Street Rule”: If
investors don’t like what management is doing, they should sell their
217
shares and take their money somewhere else.
Some mutual funds did take an interest in long-term corporate
welfare after the recent scandals. Some voted their shares to oppose
218
executive stock options, and several announced that they would
take a more activist stance and impose stricter guidelines regarding
219
corporate governance.
Nevertheless, the general approach of
mutual funds toward long-term investing remains unclear. Unless
funds could be counted on to reward good long-term corporate
behavior, it is hard to see how they could be the catalyst for
competition among public corporations in the arena of auditing and
financial disclosure quality.
C. The New Watchdog: Financial Statement Insurers
Is there any private entity with an incentive to insist on the bold
detective auditing that will then incidentally serve the public’s need
for corporate transparency? So far, the outlook is not bright. The
big accounting firms, who dominate auditing, do not currently
compete with each other to offer high-quality work. Though
regulation could nudge them in that direction, the GAAP standards
would have to be reformed so that financial statement quality is more
obvious. And, even if audit quality were more transparent, we have
not identified a strong reason for corporations to pay extra for it.
Corporations could disclose raw data, leaving investors to hire their
own auditors to analyze it. Large investors who do hire auditors
might approach the status of medieval lords with their own detective
auditors combing the financial data for problems. But small investors
would need to buy such auditing services from consultants, who
might be able to succeed in the business without actually providing
the needed watchdog-quality auditing.
In short, we are still seeking a principal for the auditor with both
its own, direct interest in good detective work and the power to see
that it is delivered.

216
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The Mechanics of FSI

An intriguing suggestion is that insurance companies could be
the proper principals for auditors. The proposal is Financial
220
Statement Insurance (FSI) for public companies.
A Model
Financial Statement Insurance Act, patterned on the Trust Indenture
221
Act of 1939, has been drafted by Professor Lawrence Cunningham
222
(and described in detail by Professor Joshua Ronen ). With FSI,
companies would have the option to insure themselves against claims
that their financial statements are misleading. FSI insurers would
hire auditors to review the quality of the corporation’s accounting
and estimate the risk that it will mislead investors. Insurers would
offer companies coverage on the basis of an expert risk assessor’s
report. In Ronen’s proposal, shareholders would vote whether to
accept the maximum insurance offered, an amount suggested by
management, or no insurance at all. The key is that the FSI insurer,
and not the corporation, would commission an audit of the financial
statements. Based on the audit, FSI will be issued (or declined if the
insurer found the risk unacceptable), and the premium price
223
determined.
Crucially, Ronen proposes that the policy coverage amount and
premium cost of a corporation’s FSI policy be made public. The
amount of insurance will notify investors of what they might hope to
recover in fraud litigation. Though plaintiff investors may seek more,
courts could limit damages on the theory that what investors paid for
224
the shares already reflected the limited insurance coverage.
More
importantly, the disclosure of the premium amount would provide
information about the quality of the financial information, much as
political polls are reported together with the margin of error so that
readers can assess their reliability. High insurance at a low premium
would tell investors that the financial statements are reliable. Low
220

See Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers, supra note 147; Ronen, supra note 5. For
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coverage at a high premium would give the opposite message.
Investors would then have valuable information—what might be
called “information about the information”—to use in deciding
whether to buy a particular company’s shares.
The FSI plan also contemplates expedited evaluation of claims.
A fiduciary organization selected jointly by the insurer and the
insured corporation would do the initial review.
Then an
independent expert answering to the organization and the insurer
would review the claim. With the expert’s approval, the claim would
225
be paid expeditiously.
If the claim were denied at any stage, the
investor could sue the corporation, as it can do now.
FSI, according to Professor Ronen, would also allow GAAP to
become more principle based. Properly motivated auditors and
corporations would no longer need the guidance that complex rules
226
are supposed to provide.
Nor would comparability be a reason to
keep the detailed GAAP rules. With FSI, the financial reports would
provide a rounded narrative and investors could compare
corporations by looking at the policy limits/premium disclosure.
2.

Should FSI Be Mandatory?

A threshold question is whether FSI should be mandatory. So
far, discussion has seemed to assume that it should not. Professor
Ronen proposes that after an initial “jumpstart” period in which FSI
is mandatory in order to develop the insurance market, individual
227
corporations should be able to decide whether or not they want it.
Professor Lawrence Cunningham would not even have an initial
period of mandatory FSI, but would simply offer corporations the
choice of buying FSI or using traditional financial statement
228
auditing. This, he says, would offer “more effective self-tailoring of
229
the financial reporting and assurance process.”
The argument that FSI should be voluntary to allow corporations
to tailor their own financial disclosure proves too much. By this
reasoning, why not allow corporations to disclose unaudited financial
statements, statements audited by auditors meeting only some or
none of the Sarbanes-Oxley independence rules, or statements in
225
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230

formats other than those allowed by the SEC? Any regulation has
the effect of depriving market actors of the ability to make their own
choices in the products sold or information released. The question
becomes whether the good to be gained through regulation
outweighs the evil of limiting choice. This Article has discussed the
advantages of FSI. There is strong reason to believe that FSI cannot
work unless it is mandatory because of the way in which investors are
likely to react to a double regulatory scheme.
Recall that if FSI is voluntary, the SEC will need to keep
regulating the auditors and monitoring the financial statements of
those corporations choosing not to buy it. If we assume that
corporations who reject the outside assessment of the FSI insurer and
its auditor in favor of hiring their own auditors are more likely than
insured corporations to produce deceptive financial statements, then
residual SEC regulation of these corporations could be a problem. It
could lull investors into the false belief that their financial statements
are as good as, if not better than, those of insured corporations.
Share prices of the uninsured corporations could be doubly
higher than warranted by economic reality. Not only would there be
a greater chance that their financial statements are misleading, but
the market might not sufficiently discount for the lack of insurance
due to misplaced reliance on residual regulation of auditing. While
sophisticated investors might understand that SEC regulation was not
necessarily a mark of quality, less sophisticated investors could be
mislead. These corporations, in other words, could benefit by not
buying FSI. This could trigger a race to the bottom, destroying the
system and leaving FSI to be used by only a small top tier of
corporations. On the other hand, mandatory minimum FSI will
provide a level playing field and comparability of information. For
every corporation, investors will know that the auditors work for
insurers and that FSI coverage and premium information is available
for comparison.
Mandatory FSI would benefit the regulatory system in two ways.
First, the SEC would not need to provide residual regulation for noninsured issuers. It could get out of the business of routine auditing
regulation and disclosure oversight, freeing resources for other uses,
including prosecution of what should be a reduced number of
deceptive financial disclosure cases. Second, if all issuers buy FSI, all
of them will be able to disclose the amount of the FSI premium,
which will be an independent indicator of the quality of financial
230

See,
e.g.,
Securities
and
Exchange
Commission
Forms
List,
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/secforms.htm (last modified Aug. 22, 2005).

2005

AUDITING REGULATION

1089

statements. If FSI is optional, this information will be available for
some companies but not all.
Furthermore, mandatory FSI will still afford corporations a great
degree of flexibility. Shareholders can select the insurer, terms of
coverage (within limits), and the amount of coverage. The law would
set a legal minimum of coverage, perhaps calculated, as Professor
Ronen suggests, as a multiple of the corporation’s “largest negative
231
earnings surprise” over the previous three to five years, but
companies could signal quality by buying more. Thus, by mandating
FSI, the government would extricate itself from auditing regulation,
while providing a “floor” of good behavior for the market and
reliability for investors.
As a significant departure from current regulation, FSI will
certainly require testing; for instance, it could be optional for a
period of time, or it could be mandatory in selected industries or for
issuers in a particular market-capitalization size range. Nevertheless,
strong consideration should be given to making it mandatory to
obtain its full benefits without wasteful and confusing duplicate
regulation.
3.

Elements of a Regulatory Framework

Whether FSI is mandatory or whether it is just a permitted
alternative to current auditing practices, there should be federal
minimum standards for FSI policies in order to see that policies
adequately protect investors and that the disclosed information
regarding policy size and premium really does give investors useful
information about the corporation.
Regarding the content of policies, as Professor Cunningham
points out, FSI is more akin to title insurance than to traditional
232
liability insurance.
A company writing title insurance examines a
property’s deed and title documents and, if it is satisfied that title is
good, insures that there are no defects. FSI insurers will likewise
examine the financial statements and, if satisfied, issue a policy. Each
is insuring the dependability of information, rather than offering
protection against fortuitous events. In both cases, claims may not
arise until years later. Thus, FSI policies should be occurrence based,
233
rather than claims based. If a policy is occurrence based, it covers
damages resulting from an occurrence while it is in effect, even if a
claim does not surface until later. This way, if an investor relies on
231
232
233

Ronen, supra note 5, at 68.
Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers, supra note 147, at 444–45.
Id. at 455–56.

1090

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 35:1029

misrepresentation while the policy is in force, the claim is covered,
even if the policy is cancelled the next day. Investors could count on
having an FSI policy to turn to as long as they confirmed before
investing that the corporation was insured.
Insurance policies should also be required to cover claims
234
against insured corporations that are bankrupt.
This is important
even though the Sarbanes-Oxley Act made debts for judgments and
settlements connected with securities law violations non235
dischargeable in bankruptcy. Non-dischargeability only preserves a
debt—it does nothing to make funds available to pay it. With
insolvent corporations unable to pay fraud judgments, investors
naturally look to other defendants; but in 1995, Congress severely
limited the doctrine of joint and several liability for securities fraud.
A corporation that commits securities fraud often does so on its way
into bankruptcy, but may be aided by a number of parties that survive
and are solvent such as lawyers, securities analysts, and auditors.
These solvent parties, however, are little comfort to injured investors,
because they, like the disclosing corporation itself, can be held liable
236
only for their proportionate share of the losses.
In short, even if
investors are awarded full damages in a fraud proceeding, they are
often unable to collect. FSI could remedy this.
Insurance coverage that survives the demise of the insured
corporation will not only protect investors, but should also lead
insurers to take steps to reduce the risk of catastrophic loss. For
instance, in some cases, insurers could require that policies be
backed by executives’ personal guarantees to prevent them from
looting a corporation, keeping the proceeds, and leaving the insurer
237
to pay off deceived investors.
Insurers may also insist that
234

Obviously, insurers should be safeguarded against a deluge of ill-founded
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examiner may “investigate the . . . liabilities . . . of the debtor”).
235
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 803, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19) (Supp. II 2002).
236
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 201, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f)
(2000); see also Enron Hearings, supra note 64, at 5–6 & n.7.
237
These guarantees will buttress the Sarbanes-Oxley provision that executives
repay bonuses after a major restatement. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 304, 15 U.S.C. § 7243.
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corporations communicate better with stock-holding employees.
Many of the small investors hurt in the Enron collapse were Enron
employees who owned company stock in their retirement accounts,
had not been encouraged to diversify, and were prevented from
selling shares by a freeze just at the time share prices were
238
plummeting.
Furthermore, the FSI scheme may need to regulate how insurers
set FSI premiums. A key aspect of FSI is that disclosed premium costs
and policy limits give investors information about the quality of
corporations’ financial statements. This assumes that insurers will
underwrite carefully, so that the premium a company pays for FSI
actually represents the risk that its financial statements might be
misleading. One worry is that to compete for business, insurers will
239
set premiums too low.
This is hardly unique to FSI but occurs in
any insurance market and is met by countervailing economic
pressure to correctly assess premiums so that enough money is taken
in to cover the risk of having to pay claims. State insurance laws may
also regulate premiums to minimize the risk of insurers becoming
240
insolvent.
And, insurers should find it easier to calculate FSI
premiums than liability insurance premiums. As with title insurance,
the bulk of the cost is in investigation, rather than in reserves for
paying claims (as with liability policies). Once the insurer has
audited the financial statements, it should have an excellent idea of
the risk.
Another worry is that corporations might buy too much
insurance if they believe that this shows particular confidence in the
quality of their books. As Professor Cunningham suggests, this can
be resolved by linking coverage to a metric such as the company’s
241
market capitalization. Corporations might also try to manipulate to
their advantage the premium/coverage figures through coverage
choices that affect premium price, such as whether insurance is
primary or secondary and whether it includes providing a defense to
suit or only indemnification of liability. It may be wise to prohibit
some of these choices through regulation; in any event, all of these
choices made by an issuer should be disclosed, perhaps in a standard
242
form chart, so that investors can make comparisons.
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FOX, supra note 1, at 289.
Cf. Chan, supra note 179, at 370–71 (stating that insurance companies have
incentive to earn premiums from companies despite the many risks involved).
240
See Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers, supra note 147, at 468–73.
241
Id. at 458–59.
242
Id. at 467 n.13.
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A related and more serious objection is that insurers might
aggregate risk by charging companies that are known to present a
high risk for issuing misleading financial information the same
premium as those known to present low risks. If this were to happen,
premium cost will obviously be less useful information. There are
both market and regulatory checks available to control this sort of
pooling. The market check is that insurers will want an accurate risk
assessment so that the premium is set at a level that covers expected
claims. Although for many kinds of insurance, insurers classify
applicants as high-, medium-, or low-risk, and then use appropriate
form contracts, this is generally not done for Directors & Officers and
entity insurance. There, policies are individually tailored to the
243
company’s particular risks.
Since FSI involves issues of similar
complexity, there is no reason not to expect insurers to tailor FSI
policies similarly. They will have the information to do it; in Ronen’s
proposal, insurers will do a preliminary audit before even offering an
244
FSI policy.
Insurers might pool the risks of smaller companies in particular
industries, on the theory that the risk assessment can be made with
rough accuracy, and thus avoid the expense of a specific inquiry.
This could benefit small companies by lowering their insurance costs,
though it concededly would produce FSI premiums that did not
precisely reflect individuated risk. Another danger might be that FSI
insurers would pool FSI risk with risks on, for instance, life insurance
or accident policies.
These pooling problems do not seem insurmountable but they
should not be ignored. One solution would be for the SEC to
prohibit insurers from pooling FSI risks with non-FSI risks. Proof of
this could be in the form of a state regulator’s certification that the
FSI insurer would present to the SEC. The SEC would determine
which insurance products are “Qualified FSI.” The SEC could also
provide a procedure allowing insurance companies to show the need
for risk pooling for companies below a particular size. If a risk pool
were approved, the disclosed premium amount would also bear a
notation indicating that the insurer had used pooled risk in
calculating the individual FSI premiums and perhaps referring the
investor to the insurer’s application and SEC decision (which could
be posted on the SEC’s website).
In short, FSI is a good market solution to the problem of
misleading financial disclosure. However, there must be a regulatory
243
244

Id. at 457.
See Ronen, supra note 5, at 50–51.
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framework to ensure that all public companies use it, that coverage
survives the demise of the insured corporation, and that premiums
correctly reflect risk.
4.

FSI Returns Auditors to the Role of Detective

The overwhelming advantage of FSI is that auditors will finally
be free to play one role only, that of detective. Because the FSI
insurer wants to minimize its risk, it will insist on a thorough,
impartial audit, including verification of assets and revenue, rather
than just sample testing of records. Auditors will comply to please
the insurer, who can offer repeat business, if not an in-house
position.
Mandatory FSI will also demonstrate the traits of a healthy
disclosure system. It will create several strong intermediaries for
investors. The FSI insurer is obviously such an intermediary. The
fiduciary claims-handling organization is another; it will make
investors better able to recover damages if they have been deceived.
FSI also provides more useful information. Corporations will
produce better financial statements to begin with and auditors will
audit them more carefully. Crucially, the policy size and cost will
indicate the insurer’s assessment of the quality of the financial
statements, a valuable piece of additional information. Finally, FSI
gives corporations incentives to improve disclosure voluntarily in
order to qualify for high coverage at a low premium. The savings may
not represent a great deal of money to the corporation, though they
could matter to the division that prepares the financial statements.
More importantly, the low premium will signal to investors that the
company’s statements are accurate.
FSI could be accommodated with less change in current
practices than might be expected. First, FSI will work within existing
liability rules because investors will be able to compare FSI premiums
and policy amounts at any level (i.e., if liability rules favor
corporations, all rates will be low; if they favor investors, all will be
high). It can be objected that the existence of insurance will
encourage claims, some of which will be false or exaggerated. The
245
expedited claims process that Ronen proposes should be able to
deal with these claims; and, as noted, the PSLRA already sets a high
246
bar for pleading a securities fraud case.
Second, there would be
less need for the sort of changes in the accounting profession
discussed above. Insurers could simply engage auditors from the
245
246
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existing Big Four. Because of the insurers’ need for a good audit,
they may well refuse to hire auditors whose firms do non-audit work
for the audited corporation. Very likely, insurers would hire in-house
accountants to make a career of auditing. Third, there would be no
need to change GAAP because auditors will have no incentive to
manipulate the rules. As Professor Ronen states, FSI could make it
easier to reform GAAP to focus on principles, not detail. Finally, the
SEC will not need to get into the business of regulating insurance
companies, but can instead cooperate with state insurance
247
regulators.
With this proposal, we have come full circle. Like the medieval
lord, the insurer will be a principal with a self-interested reason to
demand candor from the auditor. FSI resolves the confusion of
auditors’ roles inherent in securities disclosure auditing since 1933.
Auditors can return to their first job of being good detectives, finding
and reporting defects in financial statements.
CONCLUSION
There is something disturbing about corporations hiring their
own auditors. As a federal judge commented in introducing an SEC
roundtable on auditing reform, it is as if slaughterhouses hired their
248
own meat inspectors.
The intuition that something is wrong is
confirmed when we analyze the law to see what role it expects the
auditor to play.
Historically, medieval auditors were detectives whose job was to
scrutinize the accounts of their clients’ agents in depth. Later,
auditors did certification auditing, in which their clients engaged
them to review and approve information to be disclosed to others. In
auditing for securities financial disclosure, the law calls on the
auditor to play the role of detective. The auditor, however, is still
hired by the audited corporation, which has reason to prefer merely
certification auditing. Even as reformed by Sarbanes-Oxley, federal
247

Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers, supra note 147, at 468–73 (noting that
federal securities laws already rely on state corporation law, and that despite the
strong protection of state insurance regulation from federal involvement, the federal
government does have a hand in insurance regulation via its offering of reinsurance
in extraordinary situations including nuclear reactors, terrorism, and floods). It has
been suggested that insurance regulation should be federalized, given the scope and
complexity of the modern insurance industry. The importance that FSI insurance be
subject to uniform, high-quality regulation could lend support to those who favor
that insurance regulation be federalized rather than left to the states.
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SEC. & EXCH COMM’N, ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION ON FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE AND
AUDITOR OVERSIGHT (Mar. 6, 2002), www.sec.gov/spotlight/roundtables/
accountround030602.htm.
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securities law reflects this divide. Some rules try to ensure good
detective work (e.g., by having the auditor report to directors, not
management), while others try to ensure honest certification (e.g., by
limiting business relations between auditor and audit client). But all
leave the auditor in the difficult position of having a legal duty—to
serve as a “watchdog for the public”—that is, at the very least, in
tension with the interests of his or her client.
Regulatory reforms, including the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, have
never separated the auditor’s two roles. To succeed, however, reform
must give auditors clear direction. If auditors continue to be hired by
the audited corporation and to play the certification role, they must
be fully independent of the client and be able to assess information
quality against clear standards. If they are to be detectives, they must
have an appropriate principal, namely, someone who wants a candid
audit report. In this Article I have tested a number of reform
proposals against these criteria.
Of four proposals to improve certification auditing, the one best
able to stop auditor corruption and encourage competition for
quality auditing is probably real-time disclosure of simplified
information. This is promising, but has the potential to recreate the
current problem if investors come to rely on financial information
analysts who may have their own incentives to be sloppy or less than
candid. As for detective auditing, the key is that the auditor report to
someone who, unlike the audited corporation, has an interest of its
own in ensuring aggressive auditing. One proposal is that auditors
work for the government, but political concerns over federalism and
government interference in business decisions, as well as the
likelihood of undependable funding seem to rule out that option.
The best reform proposal is that corporations be required to
insure their financial statements against liability for misleading
investors. Insurers would hire auditors to ensure that the statements
were not misleading. Because insurers have a financial interest in
good auditing in order to avoid paying claims, they will want the
auditor to be a good detective. Thus, FSI would fulfill the original
vision of securities law as harnessing private incentives to serve the
public good. It ends the certification/detective confusion that has
plagued public auditing for seventy years. It finally gives auditors a
client who wants them to be the public’s watchdog.

